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ABSTRACT
The presence of a rich set of embedded sensors on mobile devices has been fuelling
various sensing applications regarding the activities of individuals and their surround-
ing environment, and these ubiquitous sensing-capable mobile devices are pushing the
new paradigm of Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) from concept to reality. MCS aims
to outsource sensing data collection to mobile users and it could revolutionize the
traditional ways of sensing data collection and processing. In the meantime, cloud
computing provides cloud-backed infrastructures for mobile devices to provision their
capabilities with network access. With enormous computational and storage resources
along with sufficient bandwidth, it functions as the hub to handle the sensing ser-
vice requests from sensing service consumers and coordinate sensing task assignment
among eligible mobile users to reach a desired quality of sensing service. This paper
studies the problem of sensing task assignment to mobile device owners with specific
spatio-temporal traits to minimize the cost and maximize the utility in MCS while
adhering to QoS constraints. Greedy approaches and hybrid solutions combined with
bee algorithms are explored to address the problem.
Moreover, the privacy concerns arise with the widespread deployment of MCS
from both the data contributors and the sensing service consumers. The uploaded
sensing data, especially those tagged with spatio-temporal information, will disclose
the personal information of the data contributors. In addition, the sensing service
requests can reveal the personal interests of service consumers. To address the pri-
vacy issues, this paper constructs a new framework named Privacy-Preserving Mobile
Crowd Sensing (PP-MCS) to leverage the sensing capabilities of ubiquitous mobile
devices and cloud infrastructures. PP-MCS has a distributed architecture without
relying on trusted third parties for privacy-preservation. In PP-MCS, the sensing
service consumers can retrieve data without revealing the real data contributors. Be-
i
sides, the individual sensing records can be compared against the aggregation result
while keeping the values of sensing records unknown, and the k-nearest neighbors
could be approximately identified without privacy leaks. As such, the privacy of the
data contributors and the sensing service consumers can be protected to the greatest
extent possible.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) technology have en-
abled the development of low-cost, low-power, multi-functional and small-size sensors
to be embedded in mobile devices, such as smartphones, wearable devices and in-
vehicle sensors. Many mobile devices come with Internet connectivity and embedded
sensors (e.g., accelerometers, gyroscope, microphone, video camera, GPS, and speed
sensors), thereby turning themselves into well-functioned sensor boxes to probe per-
sonal activities and environmental phenomena in the vicinity. Consequently, a new
sensing paradigm named Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS) comes into being to harness
the potential of the widespread mobile sensors and describe the dynamic patterns of
the physical world across a wide variety of application domains.
These sensing capable mobile devices, which consist of sensing, data processing,
and communicating components, represent a significant improvement over traditional
sensors networks. Most existing sensor networks still require overwhelming expendi-
ture and professional personnel for both deployment and long-term maintenance,
which are unaffordable for individuals and small companies. As a result, many areas
of interest are out of sensing coverage and the collected data are insufficient for various
application requirements. Worse still, the underutilization of current sensor networks
and sensor-equipped mobile devices are wasteful of existing investment, as the sensor
motes are static and they stay in hibernation mode most of time. Comparatively,
MCS offers several advantages over the traditional sensor network infrastructures.
First, MCS is built on the already-existing mobile devices with broad network access
(e.g., cellular base stations and wifi access points), which are globally widespread and
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ready to be used. The International Data Corporation reported that vendors shipped
a total of 258.4 million smartphones in the third quarter of 2013 [1]. The persua-
siveness of smartphones on an unprecedented scale reduces the deployment cost to
almost zero, while the traditional static sensor networks involve overwhelming de-
ployment costs that cannot be afforded by individuals and small enterprises. What’s
more, the movement of mobile device carriers implicates high spatio-temporal cover-
age and increases the possibility of capturing unexpected events as compared to static
sensor networks. In addition, many existing mobile devices come with open-source
platforms, cloud back-end support and app stores (e.g., Google Play, Windows Store,
Apple App Store) allowing third party programmers to deploy their sensing appli-
cations across the globe and enable sophisticated analysis of big sensor data. Last
but not the least, the human involvement could provide additional intelligence such
as persuasive user feedback on the sensor data, thus promoting the quality of service
and improving the user experience of sensing applications.
1.1 MCS Overview
The MCS system is built on a generic multi-tier service model as illustrated in
Figure . A typical MCS system consists of the following parties:
• Mobile Device Owners (MDOs): The geographically distributed physical sens-
ing networks comprise of conventional sensor nodes and programmable smart-
phones equipped with embedded sensors. The owners of these sensing devices
are termed as Mobile Device Owners (MDOs). The MDOs register their het-
erogeneous sensor nodes, either static or mobile, at Cloud Provider (CP) to
maximize the utilization of the physical sensing resources. As such, the MDOs
collaboratively construct the physical substrate sensing networks.
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• Cloud Providers (CPs): The CPs provide all the necessary IT hardware infras-
tructures and system software to interface and manage the substrate physical
sensing network resources. Note that there may exist multiple CPs and they
can collaborate with each other through pre-defined interfaces.
• Sensing Service Consumers (SSCs): The SSCs issue queries for sensing data
(e.g., ”the average temperature in Phoenix in the past month”) and obtain
reports.
• Sensing Service Providers (SSPs): The SSPs are the running applications
hosted by the CPs. They act as intermediaries between the SSCs and the
CPs. The SSPs can avoid the overwhelming expenditure and technical pitfalls
resulted from the deployment and long-term maintenance of traditional sensor
networks, and enjoy greatly simplified processing of the sensing service requests
by acquiring available sensing resources through the CP and searching historical
sensing records stored in the cloud databases. In this way, the CP not only acts
as mediator between the SSPs and the MDOs, but also maintain a buyer-seller
relationship between SSPs and MDOs.
1.1
In the MCS infrastructure, MDOs need to create sensor abstracts for sensing
devices including the communication protocols, the operating systems, the deploy-
ment positions and the mobility state as well as hardware details, such as the micro-
controller, on-board RAM, flash memory, battery power and storage. In addition,
MDOs need to append their individual network topologies as well as adjacent reach-
ability information to establish the links across different sensing domains. Subse-
quently, MDOs register their sensing devices at the CP with corresponding sensor
abstracts, such that their individual infrastructure can be leased to different SSPs to
3
SSC
SSP
CP
MDO
Figure 1.1: Architectural Overview of MCS
run sensing applications through the CP. Correspondingly, the CP can label sensing
resources with their sensor abstracts, and interconnect them based on their physi-
cal links and topology information. As a result, MCS creates an ecosystem wherein
different parties can mutually benefit from each other.
4
1.2 Sensing Service Query Processing and Access Control
Sensing service query preprocessing is critical to the performance of MCS in prac-
tice. First of all, the mobile cloud enforces authentication and authorization over the
SSCs, and only the eligible SSCs are allowed to pose sensing service requests along
with bid prices for specific sensing services. In addition, many SSCs subscribe to
events that satisfy certain predicates, and the SSPs and the CP should guarantee
timely delivery of published events to all the interested service consumers. Generally
speaking, each query consists of a series of predicates, such as the temperature lying
between 25◦C and 30◦C, and events occurred within a certain area. Evaluation of
these predicates result in significant system resource consumption, especially when
there exists a large number of queries waiting in a queue. However, some queries
may share the same predicates, and such overlap can be exploited to reduce the eval-
uation cost. In addition, a query usually consists of multiple predicates, and the
’false’ evaluation result of the predicate at the beginning removes the need to eval-
uate the following predicates. Moreover, if the such a predicate is shared by many
other queries, all the identical predicates in these queries can be ignored, and this
can significantly accelerate the query evaluation process. Therefore, Liu et al. [2] pro-
posed a sub-order algorithm to first evaluate the predicates with low selectivity (i.e.,
the probability that an event satisfies a given predicate), such that they have larger
chances to eliminate other predicates. In the meantime, it utilizes linked-chains to
connect any two queries if they share the same predicate. As such, the evaluation
result of any given predicate can be shared across different queries, and the system
evaluation overhead can be remarkably reduced. Nevertheless, it does not support the
range predicate case. In addition, it brings remarkable overhead in case of inserting
and deleting queries, because it has to maintain a graph where there exists a link
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between every two queries if they share the same predicate.
Some clustering schemes [3, 4] were also proposed to improve the sensing event
matching by clustering the queries, such as K-means clustering, spanning tree based
clustering and grid partitioning. However, the resulting clusters are partially over-
lapped and this incurs false negative events or false positive events. In addition,
the queries can be aggregated, filtered and matched by Bloom filters [5,6]. However,
their requirements of limited set of possible publication and query attributes limit the
expressiveness, and the usage of Bloom filter brings false positive or false negative
results. Mehedi Hassan et al. [7] developed a dynamic and fast content-based pub-
lish/subscribe information dissemination system for automatic fusion and delivery of
large amounts of sensor data to service consumers. It exhibits good support of range
predicates while eliminating false positive and false negative results.
An important privacy issue related to the sensing service query is that it can expose
the interest of sensing service consumers. One solution to this issue is to conceal
the identity information by applying attribute-based access control and relying on
independent identity service providers, which is detailed in chapter 4. Attribute-
based access control offers a salient feature of anonymity, as it grants data access to
service consumers with attributes satisfying specific attribute policies. The identity
service providers takes IDs in the registration process and offers proofs of attribute
ownership for authorization purpose. Another solution is to hide critical content of
the sensing queries by mixing the targeting data sources (e.g., mobile device owners,
locations, time periods) with untargeted data sources with cryptographic techniques,
which is detailed in chapter 2.
6
1.3 Sensing Task Assignment
Upon receiving the processed sensing service requests, the CP should accordingly
locate appropriate sensing resources based on the sensor abstracts taking account of
sensing capability, resource limitation and infrastructure support. In addition, differ-
ent sensing service requests have different requirements in spatio-temporal coverage.
The event-driven sensing applications (e.g., continuous surveillance in public places in
case of emergency) usually require high spatiotemporal coverage ratio or even a com-
plete spatiotemporal coverage, while low spatiotemporal coverage ratio would suffice
some data-driven sensing applications, such as the pattern extraction of long-term
variations in air quality in a city, because the segmentation and sampling algorithms
can be leveraged to infer the measurements in uncovered spatiotemporal space and
reduce costs. Consequently, the CP only selects the sensing devices equipped with
sensors corresponding to the sensing service requests, and the traces of the sensing
devices should appear in concerned areas during time intervals of interest.
The behaviour patterns of the mobile device owners also have direct impact on
the quality of the collected sensing data, and it is important to select appropriate
sensing devices from a pool of candidates based on the evaluation results of the
historical information regarding the corresponding MDOs. As with the recruitment
framework [8], it checks the candidates’ previous spatiotemporal coverage over the
area of interest and data collection reputation based on the historical data sets, and
selects well-suited participants out of the candidates to achieve maximum utility.
Specially, participants who are active in sensing data collections are preferred than
passive participants, but the resulting costs should be taken into consideration, as
the active ones may demand high payback. The quality assessment can take place
periodically, and additional participants might be recruited if the sensing campaign
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experiences underperformance. In addition, strong incentive mechanisms should be
implemented to motivate the participants to carry out the sensing tasks and prevent
them from opt-out. For instance, the participants with similar interest can form a
virtual group to take sensing tasks together due to their common concerns (e.g., the
concern about the air pollution density of their ambient environment). Also, the
mobile clouds can provide the participants with free services (e.g., health monitoring)
in exchange for their participation in some sensing tasks. A straightforward method
is to offer the participants monetary incentives, and the participants with outstanding
performance can receive more monetary rewards than those who underperform, but
the overall budget should not exceed what the SSCs can afford.
1.4 Privacy-Preserving Sensing Data Processing
In some cases, the sensing service query only need to retrieve data originated from
one independent data source (e.g., the SSP or a single MDO). Choi et al. [9] applied
homomorphic encryption to allow the client to securely determine if her location is
in the proximity zone of a target, or if the target is in the proximity zone of the
client. More often than not, the MCS usually relies on many mobile devices to co-
operatively feed the sensing readings into the data stores of the CP in response to
various sensing service requests. Specifically, the sensing service consumers need to
study the distribution of the input sensing data, and their sensing service requests
only require aggregation results (e.g., summation, mean, deviation, maximum, mini-
mum, k-nearest) derived from the sensing readings of multiple mobile devices rather
than individual sensing record values. As such, it is necessary to derive aggregate
result from various data resources without breaching individual privacy by revealing
specific sensing record values. Chapter 3 explores how to privately compare each
individual sensing record value against specified ratio of the summation of all sensing
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values derived from secure multi-party computation. It further studies how to ap-
proximately identify the k-nearest neighboring sensing readings without disclosing the
exact values of the benchmark location and any sensing readings. Note that the same
techniques can be easily extended to the benchmark data and the sensing readings of
any dimensions other than the two-dimensional location data.
1.5 Parallel Data Processing
The MCS rests on potential millions of mobile devices to feed the massive volumes
of data streams into the data stores of the CP in response to various sensing service
requests. Imagine a scenario wherein a sensing application for real-time dust storm
monitoring in Phoenix area requires each participant to transmit a 60-byte data
packet with coordinates to the CP every three seconds. Suppose one million local
residents subscribe for this application, and together they will contribute 1.2 Gbytes
of data per minute. These collected data need to be analysed in a timely manner
to extract knowledge and broadcast alarms, which cannot be done in traditional
computing environment.
Hadoop is an implementation of the emerging parallel computing model MapRe-
duce [10]. It is able to process the potentially massive amount of sensor readings
concurrently. Two types of nodes, a jobtracker and multiple tasktrackers, are used to
control the job execution process as shown in Figure 1.2(a). The jobtracker schedules
sensing data processing tasks to run on the tasktrackers, and the tasktrackers keep
records of the running jobs and submit reports to the jobtracker. Once a sensing
data processing tasks fails, the jobtracker immediately reschedules it to a different
tasktracker to run. The tasktracker works by breaking the MapReduce job into the
map task and the reduce task. All the sensor readings are prepared in the form of
key-value pair < k1, v1 >, and each map processor is assigned its k1 to work on. The
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map processors take in < k1, v1 > data chunks and emit the output key-value pairs
< k2, v2 >. Subsequently, the output is shuffled by grouping the pairs with the same
key k2. In consequence, the reduce processor takes < k2, list(v2) > as input to apply
reduce operation and produce new output < k3, v3 >.
map
map
map
map
TaskTracker
TaskTracker
JobTracker
Split1
reduce
<k1,v1> <k2,v2>
<k2,list(v2)>
<k3,v3>
Shuffle
Merge
Split1
Split1
Split1
(a)
MapReduce<B,1>
(b)
<A,9>
Hadoop master
Hadoop slaveHadoop slave
Figure 1.2: Hadoop: a) MapReduce Data Flow b) A Clustering Example of Parallel
Processing
A simple example of the data analysis with parallel processing is to partition all
the mobile devices within a monitored region into different clusters with high and
10
low population density. The Hadoop in MCS can take advantage of the locality of
mobile devices and uses two map-reduce phases to perform partitioning as illustrated
in Figure 1.2(b). The first map-reduce phase computes the neighbour density for
all the mobile devices. Assume we have m mobile devices within the monitored
region. For a specific mobile device DevIDi(i ∈ [1,m]), the other mobile devices that
have a distance no more than a given radius r are deemed as its neighbours, and
the map function produces a key-value pair 〈DevIDi, yes〉 for each neighbour and
〈DevIDi, no〉 for a non-neighbour. As a result, the map function produces m(m −
1) pairs of 〈DevIDi, yes/no〉 in total. The shuffle function derives the number of
neighbours for each mobile device DevIDi by counting the number of 〈DevIDi, true〉
locally, while the reduce function counts the number of neighbours ni for each mobile
device DevIDi globally and emit 〈DevIDi, ni〉. For example, the resulting key-value
pair for the mobile device A is 〈A, 9〉 and that for mobile device B is 〈B, 1〉. In the
second phase, two centroids nj and nk are selected for the high-density cluster and
low-density cluster respectively where j, k ∈ [1,m]. The map function assigns each
〈DevIDi, ni〉 to the closest centroid, and the reduce function computes the average
number of neighbours in each cluster and updates the two centroids. The map-reduce
operation proceeds recursively until the centroids do not change and the clustering is
complete.
1.6 Data Presentation
The processed sensing data sets need to be presented to the SSCs with application-
specific formats. It directly impacts the SSCs’ evaluations of sensing services, there-
fore it must convey the sensing results effectively and elegantly. A variety of conven-
tional methods are leveraged to present the data, such as tables, plots, histograms,
pie charts and so on. Accordingly, the data must be formatted first to be able to feed
11
into the application interfaces. For the location-based sensing services, the sensing
results are usually converted into geographic markup languages such as csv and KML,
and demonstrated to the SSCs using Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping
applications.
12
Chapter 2
RESEARCH BACKGROUND
MCS possesses the potential to merge into the fabric of everyday life by offering
highly personalized services based on fine-grained spatiotemporal data. Nevertheless,
the potential leakage of personal information regarding the involved parties could
could adversely influence the growth of MCS market. Hence, the privacy concerns
must be addressed for various sensing applications to benefit both the academia and
the industry. The privacy attacks that are investigated in this paper are categorized
in the following descriptions. The issues in existing privacy protection techniques are
analyzed, and new solutions are presented.
2.1 Sensing Task Assignment with QoS Constraints
In the procedure of sensing task assignment, the clouds assign the tasks to the
devices of the selected participating MDOs after evaluation. A typical MDO re-
cruitment process [8] in MCS includes three steps. The first step is to find suitable
MDOs who are equipped with required sensors and present in target areas within
time periods of interest. The second step evaluates the participants based on various
criteria including traces, spatiotemporal coverage, sensing costs and utilities. The
third step pushes the sensing tasks to the selected participants. In this procedure,
the requirement of Quality of Service (QoS) regarding the spatiotemporal coverage for
the specific sensing tasks should be taken into consideration. Different sensing appli-
cations may have different spatiotemporal coverage requirements. For instance, a fire
alarm sensing application system require nonstop monitoring of temperature, carbon
monoxide and carbon dioxide density levels every day in every spot of a region. Com-
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paratively, a environment monitory application system for nocturnal animal behavior
research only start to work at night around some animal habitats. Accordingly, the
sensing task assignment strategies should be adjusted based on various QoS require-
ments associated with spatiotemporal coverage. This paper first investigates greedy
approaches for the cost minimization and utility maximization with QoS constraints,
and then adopts a hybrid approach combining both greedy method and bee algorithm
for better results.
2.2 Privacy Leakage
The first category of privacy leakage stems from the sensing task assignment. In
the MDO recruitment process, it is inevitable for the clouds or other parties to ob-
tain the profile information of all possible candidates, and the task selections can be
exploited to learn the private information of participants. A semi-hones CP or SSP
may create sensing tasks with strict limitations on the attributes of participants by
requiring a special sensor type, a specific sensing area or certain behavior pattern
to narrow down the possible identities of participants. Besides, a malicious SSP can
contrive multiple sensing tasks in an attempt to link the participants for denonymiza-
tion. For example, the CP or the SSP may attempt to identify the home location
or working hours of a candidate in the name of participant selection for sensing task
assignment.
The second category of privacy leakage comes from the queries of the SSCs. The
SSCs can subscribe queries to the appropriate SSPs in request of one or more types of
sensor readings in specific regions during designated time periods. For instance, Alice
is interested in the traffic information in North Phoenix between 8am and 9am on
weekdays, and Bob subscribes to ”available pools in East Tempe at noon”. Besides,
the selected participant may demonstrate common features and behavioral patterns,
14
thereby incurring privacy leakage. The queries can be sensitive as they reflect the
SSCs’s interest and behavior pattern, they also need to be hidden and protected.
The third category of privacy leakage result from the data collections over MDOs.
In MCS, an enormous amount of potentially sensitive information could be generated
by tracking the users automatically on an ongoing basis, plentiful of sensitive infor-
mation about MDOs can be collected, thereby resulting in the violation of the privacy
of the participants’ traces, interests, life styles and so on. For example, the CP learns
that Alice is in a political parade on South Mill Avenue, Tempe, and Bob and Carol
are together in Starbucks Coffee on Thursday afternoon. As a result, the CP is able
to profile the MDOs thanks to the continuous personal data collection over long time
periods. Even one single task action does not breach the privacy, the identities and
attributes can be disclosed by linking multiple task actions together.
The fourth category of privacy leakage derives from the access control of shared
sensing data. In some cases, the MDOs may voluntarily collect data for future pub-
lic use of specific SSCs in certain attribute domains without sensing service queries
in advance. For example, some volunteers donate their health information to some
repositories for the possible future use of public healthcare research institutes. How-
ever, the conventional methods of showing certificates would expose the identities of
the SSCs and raise privacy concerns. Therefore, specific access control strategies need
to be designed such that the SSCs may want to access these data anonymously after
demonstrating that they belong to the attribute domain of public healthcare without
exposing their identities.
2.3 Issues in Existing Privacy Protection Techniques
Information access control techniques [11, 12] require a trusted middle-ware ser-
vice lying between location-based applications and the mobile users to enforce access
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control over geo-spatial data by rule-based access policies. Specifically, LocServ [11]
answers queries of three types: i) requests for user location identified by the users’
unique identifiers ii) enumeration requests to return lists of users at specific locations
iii) asynchronous requests to notify events when users enter or leave areas of interest.
The enforcement mechanism in [12] consists of a spatio-temporal module, an encoder
and the ASM-trie, and it follows a hierarchical access control model to enable adap-
tive search and support positive and negative location-based data access. While the
techniques stated above depend on the third party to enforce the access control over
the location-based data, they are vulnerable to the malicious behaviors of the third
party.
Mix-zones [13, 14] also utilize middle-ware between the mobile users and the
location-based application such that the location-based applications receive and reply
pseudonymous messages from the mobile users. Specifically, the middle-ware assures
the unlinkability of their pseudonyms by assigning a new, unused pseudonym to the
mobile users when they enter a mix zone, and thus the location-based application
cannot link the users emerging from the mix zone to the ones going into the mix
zone. MobiMix [14], an application of mix-zones over road networks, develop a suite
of construction methods to protect the location privacy of the mobile users. By the
same token, it is subject to malicious behaviors of the third party middle-ware, as
the middle-ware functions as a proxy to anonymize the locations of mobile users.
K-anonymity [15] ensures the information for each person in a release cannot be
distinguished from at least k − 1 individuals whose information are also in the same
release. As a result, an attacker can identify a user based on the location information
with probability no more than 1/k. PRIVACYGRID [16] provides effective cloaking
algorithms for location k-anonymity and l-diversity in a mobile environment wherein
the mobile users communicate with the location-based service servers via location
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anonymization servers. Casper [17] uses the location anonymizer server to blur the
users’ exact information into cloaked spatial regions based on user-specified privacy
requirements, and the privacy-aware query processor of the database only deal with
the cloaked spatial areas instead of the exact location. In [18], a mobile user has to
collaborate with k − 1 peers to cloak her exact location into a spatial region before
querying the location-based database server. All these k-anonymity schemes rely
on the assumption that the third party is entrusted, which is usually infeasible in
real-world settings.
Comparatively, the dummy location approaches [19, 20] eliminate the need of a
third party server by generating redundant location-related data. In [19], a mobile
user sends true location data with several dummy location data to a location-based
service provider. The dummy locations are generated randomly and they are not real
user locations as in the k-anonymity schemes. The privacy of the user location is
protected as the location-based service provider cannot distinguish the true location
from several dummy locations. SibilQuery [20] allows the user to generate k − 1
Sybil queries to achieve k-anonymity, such that the location-based server is unable
to distinguish between the user’s real query and the Sybil queries. As the dummy
location approaches rely on data redundancy rather than third-party anonymizer,
they significantly increase the system overhead and complexity. At the same time,
the location-based service provider can narrow down to the sub-space of the exact
location, thereby resulting a weak privacy.
Data transformation involves data owners, data users and clouds. The data owner
uses certain encoding methodology to transform his data sets before outsourcing them
to the cloud, while the data user attempts to retrieve the encrypted data sets with
queries and perform decryption with the transformation keys derived from the data
owner. The cloud is honest-but-curious about the encrypted data sets, and the cloud
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can perform search over the encrypted data sets based on the data user’s encoded
queries although they are unreadable. OPES [21] encrypts the data in an order-
preserving manner to enable distance comparison operations. Wong et al. [22] allows
kNN processing by using a secure point transformation to preserve the distances of
points of interests relative to any query points. Khoshgozaran et al. [23] proposed to
use Hilbert transformation to transform the points while the parameters (e.g., scale,
order) keep secret. The data transformation techniques are vulnerable to access
pattern attacks, and they are not scalable in real-world settings, because each data
user has to get the transformation key from the data owner, thereby resulting in
unbearable offline communication overhead.
Personal Information Retrieval (PIR) [24, 24–30] protocols allow a user to obtain
the i-th record from the database server without disclosing which record he is obtain-
ing. First, the user pins down his location index in the database via the location-based
service provider without revealing his whereabouts. In this phase, Paulet et al. [29]
utilize oblivious transfer while Ghinita et al. [25,26] employ homomorphic encryptions.
After that, the user relies on PIR protocols to retrieve points of interests associated
with the index from the location-based service provider. Trusted hardware [28] can
be used to generate the secret key and permute the database. Generally speaking,
PIR protocols are secure against access pattern attacks, whereas they are too costly
to be applied in real-world settings.
At the same time, l-diversity and t-closeness has been taken into consideration in
MCS to increase anonymity and enhance privacy of the MDOs who contribute data.
In k-anonymity, any quasi-identifier present in the released data set must appear in
at least k records. Nevertheless, k-anonymity does not protect privacy when sensitive
values in an equivalence class lack diversity or the attacker has some background
knowledge. Hence, it is necessary to diversify sensitive attributes within each quasi-
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identifier equivalence class to achieve l-diversity, such that each equivalence class
has at least l well-represented sensitive class. But the sensitive values are usually
not evenly distributed, so l-diversity does not prevent probabilistic inference attacks.
Therefore, the distribution of sensitive attributes in each quasi-identifier group should
be ”close” to the entire data set to achieve t-closeness. As a result, the complexity
of data preprocessing is significantly raised while the data utility is seriously reduced
due to masked data.
Pseudonym-based methods help offer anonymity to the MDOs, but they have dif-
ficulty in maintaining the reputations associated with their online identities. The
retrieval of reputation points for a given public profile would endanger the privacy
of the MDO, as it could link to his real identity. Consequently, the process of re-
trieving reputation points should be decoupled from updating the reputation value of
some MDO’s profile. A straightforward approach is to use a pseudonym-based credit
system, where a MDO trades sensing data submission for credits from the CP. In
this manner, the MDO’s identity is untraceable as it is hidden by the pseudonym,
but the pseudonym is bound to credits. Credits are anonymous but traceable, which
implies the CPs can profile the MDOs behind pseudonyms by linking the credits. To
overcome this issue, it is necessary to change pseudonyms frequently. As a result,
the unlinkability and anonymity are preserved, while the credits associated with that
pseudonym are lost, which could demotivate the MDOs to participate in performing
the sensing tasks.
Data perturbation is useful in reducing the risk of compromising privacy, the
MDOs and the SSCs tend to submit perturbed sensing data and queries with gen-
eralized context to the CPs and the SSPs respectively. Consequently, the system
becomes less efficient and obtain reduced utility, which represents the usefulness of
sensing tasks, because the CPs may have to task a larger pool of participants and
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the SSPs need to conduct more computation to reach a certainty like a non-private
process. It is self-evident that the two goals are hard to be optimized at the same
time. Without a detailed knowledge of the context and raw data, it is hard to select
the best participants and filter out noise and corrupt data to obtain the maximal
utility. Our system should optimize the MCS processes to maximize the expected
utility while subject to privacy concerns concurrently.
2.4 The Proposed Solutions for Privacy Preservation
Homomorphic encryption plays a significant role in the proposed solutions to pre-
serve the privacy of SSC’s sensing queries, MDOs’ profiles and individual data records
without any trusted third parties. Homomorphic encryption allows computations to
be performed over ciphertext ending up with a ciphertext which equals the results of
operations performed on the plaintext when it is decrypted. Specifically, it could be
designed in sophisticated ways such that some MDOs’ computations can be neglected
in the final aggregation result while other MDOs’ computations take effect without
the awareness of the involved MDOs. As a result, no MDO knows if it is selected
as the real data source and the content privacy of the SSC’s queries are preserved.
Additionally, the signs of polynomials can be derived without disclosing the numeric
values of the data records of the involved MDOs. As such, given a baseline value
d, the difference between the sensing reading of any MDO and d can be compared
against a designated proportion of the summation of sensing reading differences of a
group of MDOs without revealing the vaues of d and any sensing readings, and it is
easy to learn if one MDO’s sensing reading difference is above or below the average
level. If there exist a large number of MDOs involved in this procedure, the paral-
lel data processing framework based on mapreduce concept can be implemented to
break the computation task of aggregation into parts and process them on different
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computation nodes concurrently to speed up the process. Although there exists a
large body of research work on parallel data processing frameworks, little attention
has been paid to the computation of data in encrypted forms in the past, and this
makes the contribution of this paper more significant.
In addition, given a benchmark location, a novel divide-and-conquer solution is
provided to approximately identify k-nearest MDOs without revealing the benchmark
location and any locations of MDOs. In this solution, all the possible distance values
between the benchmark location and MDO location are included in a distance range,
and all the MDOs agree on the privacy window of the smallest size such that the
privacy level regarding the distances of some MDOs in the worst case is still accept-
able. In each step, polynomial inequalities in encrypted form would be constructed for
each MDO’s distance and a designated pivot value, and the sign of each polynomial
inequality indicates if a MDO’s distance is below the designated pivot value. Accord-
ingly, the search range narrows down step by step in a divide-and-conquer manner
until k-nearest MDOs are identified or the size of the search range has shrunk to
the smallest acceptable size of the privacy window. The details of this solution is
elaborated in chapter 4.
Finally, a distributed access control system is designed for secure sensing data
sharing in a decentralized MCS scenarios in chapter 5. It allows the SSCs to outsource
the burdensome task of identity management to multiple trusted identity providers
and avoid single point of failure by utilizing decentralized attribute-based encryption
and identity-based encryption. At the same time, the MDOs can specify various
access control policies without causing significant system overhead by using linear
secret sharing scheme. The identity providers can prove the attribute domains that
the MDOs belong to without directly contacting the SSPs and the SSPs can make
access control decisions accordingly, thereby protecting the privacy of the historical
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access of the SSCs to the sensing data hosted by the SSPs. Centralized access control
mechanism with one trusted authority for key generation based on attribute-based
encryption can be applied in centralized MCS scenarios for easy management.
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Chapter 3
SENSING TASK ASSIGNMENT IN MCS
The timeliness and quality of the collected data become the major concerns in MCS
due to its infrastructureless and distributed nature, and thus it is critical to select
appropriate participants carried with mobile devices to provide sufficient data about
the target spatial areas during the time periods of interest and meet the application
needs at various levels. Generally, we can classify the participating candidates into two
major categories, namely regular participants and opportunistic participants. The
regular participants follow repetitive traces with a regular spatiotemporal moving
pattern during a time period (e.g., a day), and their locations at a specific time slot can
be determined a priori. Examples of regular participants include city buses, school
buses, trams, street sweepers, and so on. In contrast, the opportunistic participants
have opportunistic daily traits due to their uncontrolled mobility (e.g., pedestrians,
taxis), and their locations at a specific time cannot predicted. To maintain a stable
spatiotemporal coverage, we only consider regular participants and hereafter use
participant to refer to regular participants in this paper.
There have been some work on the sensing coverage problems in mobile sensing.
Reddy et al. [8] proposed a recruitment framework to maximize the utility associated
with spatiotemporal coverage with constrained budget in persuasive sensing, and Ri-
ahi et al. [31] presented efficient algorithms to deal with queries of different types and
maximize the total utility in participatory sensing. As the spatiotemporal coverage
has direct impact on the sensing service quality, we consider the sensing task assign-
ment problem from the perspective of spatiotemporal coverage ratio and define it as
the Quality of Service (QoS) in our MCS scenario. Different sensing applications have
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different QoS requirements. The event-driven sensing applications (e.g., continuous
surveillance in public places in case of emergency) usually require high spatiotemporal
coverage ratio or even a complete spatiotemporal coverage, while low spatiotemporal
coverage ratio would suffice some data-driven sensing applications, such as the pattern
extraction of long-term variations in air quality in a city, because the segmentation
and sampling algorithms can be leveraged to infer the measurements in uncovered
spatiotemporal space and reduce costs [32].
Consequently, we study the strategies of sensing task assignment in MCS with QoS
constraints in this paper. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the sensing campaign organizer
investigates the empirical data sets with respect to the candidates’ historical mobility
traces and transportation modes, estimates their stability in the behavioral space,
and accordingly select well-suited participants to meet various QoS requirements. As
the execution of sensing tasks inevitably incur costs due to sensor installation, battery
consumption, data storage and transmission, etc., we formulate the QoS-Constrained
Sensing Cost Minimization Problem (QSCM) with the objective of minimizing the
sensing cost while adhering to the QoS constraints. On the other hand, the spa-
totemporal coverage yields benefits for the sensing campaign organizers. We hereby
define the sensing utility as the difference between the benefits and the costs. The
benefits are proportional to the spatotemporal coverage and the costs increase with
the number of selected participants. Hence, more selected participants does not nec-
essarily result in higher utility, as the costs grow with number of participants while
the spatotemporal coverage derived from different paticipants’ mobility traces may
overlap with each other. Consequently, we formulate the QoS-Constrained Sensing
Utility Maximization Problem (QSUM) with the objective of maximizing the sensing
utility while adhering to the QoS constraints. Our contributions in this paper are
three-fold: i) we formulate the problems of cost minimization and utility maximiza-
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tion with QoS constraints in terms of spatiotemporal coverage ratio and prove that
they are NP-hard problems; ii) we present greedy approaches to address them, and
propose new heuristic hybrid approaches combining the Bees algorithm and greedy
algorithm to provide better performance; iii) we conduct extensive simulation and the
numerical results prove that the hybrid approaches outperform the greedy approaches
with lower cost and higher utility.
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Figure 3.1: Sensing Task Assignment in MCS
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives problem
formulations and offers preliminary analysis. Section III presents greedy approaches
and Section IV describes the hybrid approaches in detail. Section V evaluates their
performance and provides analysis. Section VI discusses the related work, and Section
VII concludes thise paper.
3.1 Problem Formulation and Analysis
The spatiotemporal coverage is an important metric in MCS, since the location
and time are crucial context in analysing the semantics of sensing data and exploring
the phenomena of interest. As each sensing device can only cover a spacial range
at a time, the regions of interest can be partitioned into many smaller subregions
which fit the sensing range. Also, the time span of interest can be discretized into
many fine-grained time units of equal length, e.g., 5 minutes. Consequently, the
sensing space is composed of spatiotemporal blocks along the spacial dimension and
the temporal dimension. As such, the mobility trace of each participant can be
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modelled as a series of spatiotemporal blocks in the sensing space. Consider an
urban area in Figure 3.2 where m hotspot regions Sj(1 ≤ j ≤ m) needs to be
monitored within different time intervals of interest during a time period T (e.g.,
a day), which is sliced into time units with equal duration. Accordingly, each hotspot
region Sj corresponds to a spatiotemporal domain STj of which the projection on the
temporal axis span across |Tj| time units, which could be discontinuous. There exist
a participant pool {p1, p2, . . . , pn} consisting of n participants, and each participant pi
moves along statistically equivalent trace tri consisting of spatiotemporal units during
time period T .
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, there exist three hotspot regions Sj(1 ≤ j ≤ 3) in the
urban area corresponding to the interested time intervals Tj(1 ≤ j ≤ 3) respectively.
Assume the sensing campaign organizer selects participants p1 and p2, and each par-
ticipant moves at a speed of one spatial unit per time unit. The participant p1’s trace
tr1 has 3 overlapped spatiotemporal blocks with S1 and 2 overlapped spatiotemporal
blocks with S2, while tr2 has 3 overlapped spatiotemporal blocks with S2 and 3 over-
lapped spatiotemporal blocks with S3. As a result, the spatiotemporal coverage ratio
of ST1, ST2 and ST3 can be computed as 3/|ST1| = 12.5%, (3 + 2)/|ST2| = 10.2%
and 3/|ST3| = 20%.
3.1.1 QSCM: The QoS-Constrained Sensing Cost Minimization Problem
The engagement of a new participant pn in the sensing campaign can help increase
the spatiotemporal coverage ratios of the hotspot regions, whereas it also raises the
cost cn stemmed from mobile sensor installation, battery consumption, etc. As more
participants with various traces join the sensing campaign, the actual spatiotemporal
coverage ratios could exceed the QoS requirements of the sensing applications with
unnecessary cost. The goal of QSCM is to find a subset of participants that minimize
26
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of Spatiotemperal Coverage in MCS
the overall cost while fulfilling the QoS requirement. We define the total sensing cost
as follows:
C(~x) =
∑
i∈N(di +
∑
j∈M |tri,j|bi)xi ,
where ~x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is a n-dimensional (0, 1) vector, M := {1, . . . ,m} is the
set of hotspot indexes and N := {1, . . . , n} is the collection of participant indexes.
The participant selection vector ~x represents the participant selection results (i.e.,
xi = 1 iff participant pi is selected otherwise 0). For each participant pi, di denotes
the corresponding sensor installation and maintenance cost, bi denotes the sum of the
battery consumption cost and data transmission cost per each spatiotemporal block,
and tri represents pi’s mobility trace consisting of spatiotemporal blocks. We use
tri,j = tri ∩STj to represent the set of the overlapped spatiotemporal blocks between
tri and STj. Consequently, we define the QoS criterion of STj as shown below:
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QoSj(~x) =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
xi=1,i∈N
tri,j
∣∣∣∣∣
|STj| , j ∈M
and the QSCM problem can be formulated as below:
minC(~x)
s.t. QoSj(~x) ≥ rj, ∀j ∈M
where the constraints indicate that the QoS of STj should be no less the designated
threshold for all j ∈ M . Furthermore, the QSCM problem is an NP-hard problem,
which can be proved with the Theorem 1 below:
THEOREM 1. The QSCM is an NP-hard optimization problem.
Proof of Theorem 1. This can be proved by reduction from k-partial set cover [33].
The k-partial set cover is a generalization of the well-known set cover problem. It
strives to select a minimum number of sets to cover at least k elements and it is
NP-hard. Given an instance of k-partial set cover problem (U, S, k) where U is a set
of all elements and S is the set of subsets with elements from U , we can construct
a corresponding QSCM problem ({STj, rj}j∈M , {tri,j}i∈N,j∈M , {bi, di}i∈N) with M :=
{1}, U = ST1, r1 = k/|U |, S = {tri,1}i∈N . Furthermore, we have bi = 0 and di = 1
for every i ∈ N . This construction can be done in linear time that is the same
size of k-partial set cover instance. On the other hand, if we have a QSCM in the
constructed problem with M := {1}, we can choose the subsets corresponding to the
selected participants. Consequently, the k-partial set cover can be reduced to QSCM
with M := {1} in polynomial time, which is a subproblem of QSCM. Therefore, the
QSCM problem is an NP-hard problem.
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3.1.2 QSUM: The QoS-Constrained Sensing Utility Maximization Problem
In QSUM, the utility is defined as the difference between the benefits attributed
to the spatiotemporal coverage of hotspot regions and the total cost resulting from
the sensing campaign. Different hotspots are at different levels of interest, and their
spatiotemporal coverage ratios should be assigned with different weights. Hence, the
sensing utility is defined as follows:
U(~x) =
∑
j∈M
wj|
⋃
xi=1,i∈N
tri,j| −
∑
i∈N
(di +
∑
j∈M
|tri,j|bi)xi,
where wj denotes the utility weight associated with STj, the condition (xi = 1, i ∈
M) denotes the index of selected participant pi, and
⋃
is the disjoint set union of all
the overlapped spatiotemporal blocks between tri and STj. The QoS criteria are de-
fined in the same manner as with QSCM. The objective of QSUM is to find a subset of
participants to maximize the utility while ensuring the spatiotemporal coverage ratio
associated with each hotspot is above the corresponding QoS-designated threshold,
and it can be formulated as below:
max U(~x)
s.t. QoSj(~x) ≥ rj,∀j ∈M
It can be seen that QSUM considers the utility of sensing coverage by computing the
difference between the total benefits and total costs in the objective function with the
same QoS constraints as in QSCM, and it can be proved QSUM is also an NP-hard
problem in the same manner as in Theorem 1.
3.2 The QoS-Constrained Greedy Approaches
This section presents greedy approaches to achieve the goals of cost minimiza-
tion or utility maximization while satisfying the QoS constraint. The algorithms are
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analyzed accordingly.
3.2.1 The QoS-Constrained Greedy Algorithm for Cost Minimization
In order to achieve the minimal cost with QoS constraint, a greedy approach is
proposed hereby to carry out the process of participant recruitment. It is meant to
select the participant with the maximum ratio of marginal benefit to the cost from
the pool of remaining unselected participants in each iteration of selection. For each
participant pi, its total number of spatiotemporal blocks overlapped with hotspots
is
∑
j∈M |STj
⋂
tri|, and the associated cost is ci = di +
∑
j∈M |STj
⋂
tri|bi. As a
result, its unit cost can be expressed as uci =
ci∑
j∈M |STj
⋂
tri| . In addition, we define
a function ψ : I → ~x to map the collection of participant indexes to a n-dimensional
(0, 1) vector ~x, such that the q-th element xq in ~x is set as 1 if q ∈ I, and 0 otherwise.
The algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 1.
3.2.2 The Greedy QoS-Constrained Utility Maximization Algorithm
A similar greedy approach is proposed to achieve the maximum utility with QoS
constraint in the process of participant recruitment. It is meant to choose the par-
ticipant with the maximum ratio of marginal benefit to the cost from the pool of
remaining unselected participants in each iteration of selection. The algorithm is de-
tailed in Algorithm 2. As both the two algorithms iterate through all the remaining
participants in each round for no more than n iterations, their time complexity are
both O(n2). The bound of the greedy algorithms can achieve H(∆) approximation
as shown in [33, 34] where ∆ denotes the largest size of tri and H(∆) is the ∆-th
Harmonic number.
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Algorithm 1: The QoS-Constrained Greedy Algorithm for Cost Minimization
(QGA-CM)
1 I∗ ← ∅, tr∗ ← ∅, I ← N = {1, 2, · · · , n}, ST ←
⋃
j∈M
STj and ST
∗ ← ST, ;
2 if there exists a hotspot Sj such that
|⋃i∈N tri,j|
|STj| < rj then // the pool of
participants cannot satisfy the QoS constraint
3 I∗ ← ∅;
4 else
5 while |I| > 0 and there exists a hotspot Sj such that |STj ∩ tr
∗|
|STj| < rj do
6 i∗ ← arg mini∈I di+|
⋃
i∈N tri,j |bi
|ST ∗⋂ tri| ;
7 I ← I \ {i∗}, I∗ ← I∗⋃{i∗};
8 tr∗ ← tr∗⋃ tri∗ , ST ∗ ← ST ∗ \ {tr∗};
9 end
10 end
11 ~xbest ← ψ(I∗) ;
12 return ~xbest
3.3 The QoS-Constrained Hybrid Approaches
In this section, we present hybrid approaches to fulfil the QoS requirements for task
assignment. They apply Bees algorithm [35–37] on top of the participant selection
results derived from previous greedy approaches.
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Algorithm 2: The QoS-Constrained Greedy Algorithm for Utility Maximiza-
tion (QGA-UM)
1 I∗ ← ∅, tr∗ ← ∅, I ← N = {1, 2, · · · , n}, ST ←
⋃
j∈M
STj and ST
∗ ← ST ;
2 if there exists a hotspot Sj such that
|⋃i∈N tri,j|
|STj| < rj then // the pool of
participants cannot satisfy the QoS constraint
3 I∗ ← ∅;
4 else
5 while |I| > 0 and there exists a hotspot Sj such that |STj ∩ tr
∗|
|STj| < rj do
6 ST ′j ← STj \ tr∗ ;
7 i∗ ← arg maxi∈I
∑
j∈M wj|ST ′j
⋂
tri| − ci
|ST ∗⋂ tri| ;
8 I ← I \ {i∗}, I∗ ← I∗⋃{i∗};
9 tr∗ ← tr∗⋃ tri∗ , ST ∗ ← ST ∗ \ tr∗;
10 end
11 end
12 ~xbest ← ψ(I∗) ;
13 return ~xbest
3.3.1 The QoS-Constrained Greedy Bees Algorithm for Cost Minimization
(QGBA-CM)
In this subsection, we propose a QoS-Contrained Greedy Bees Algorithm to min-
imize the cost for sensing task assignment. In this algorithm, the employed bees,
onlooker bees and scout bees cooperatively forage the optimal solution in the solu-
tion space of ~x within an acceptable time period. In the first step, the algorithm
initiates a randomly distributed population of food source positions (i.e., possible
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solutions) ~xα(1 ≤ α ≤ E} in the solution space, where ~xα is a n-dimensional vector
and E is the maximum number of employed bees. Specifically, we initiate one of the
positions with the resulting vector derived from QGACM, and then apply the random
global search in the solution space to select no more than E − 1 food positions for
the employed bees with no more than nε attempts to avoid infinite searching loops,
where ε is an adjustable parameter. Next, the algorithm starts a repeated cycle
Algorithm 3: The QoS-Constrained Greedy Bees Algorithm for Cost Mini-
mization (QGBA-CM)
1 Apply QGA-CM and derive the participant selection result ~xbest;
2 cycle← 1, ~xe ← {~xbest}, ~x∗ ← ~xe, α← 2, k1 ← 1 ;
3 while α ≤ E and k1 ≤ nε do // the employed bees’ global search
4 randomly generates a n-dimensional (0, 1) vector ~xα;
5 if ~xα /∈ ~x∗ and QoSj(~xα) ≥ rj, ∀j ∈M then
6 α← α + 1 ;
7 end
8 ~x∗ ← ~x∗⋃{~xα},~xe ← ~xe⋃{~xα}, k1 ← k1 + 1 ;
9 end
10 Continued;
as follows: each employed bee first makes modifications on the its assigned position
(i.e., solution), and their memory are shared with the onlooker bees. Accordingly,
the L(L > E) onlooker bees explore the neighbourhood of the food source positions
where each food position is selected with probabilities proportional to the correspond-
ing nectar amount (i.e., the reciprocal of cost), and they look for new positions that
can meet QoS requirements using the local search algorithm. The local search algo-
rithm uses Fflip(~x, ) as shown below to derive new vectors (i.e., food positions) in
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Algorithm 4: The QoS-Constrained Greedy Bees Algorithm for Cost Mini-
mization (QGBA-CM) Continued
1 repeat
2 foreach employed bee ~xα ∈ ~xe do
3 Lα ← C
−1(~xα)
Σ1≤α′≤EC−1(~xα′)
· L, β ← 1, k2 ← 1 ;
4 while β ≤ Lα and k2 ≤ nε do // the onlooker bees’ local search
5 ~xα,β ← Fflip(~xα, );
6 if ~xα,β /∈ ~x∗ and QoSj(~xα,β) ≥ rj,∀j ∈M then
7 β ← β + 1, ~xα ← arg min~x{C(~xα,β), C(~xα)} ;
8 end
9 ~x∗ ← ~x∗⋃{~xα,β}, k2 ← k2 + 1 ;
10 end
11 end
12 Generate a scout bee ~x′as in the global search; ~x∗ ← ~x∗⋃{~x′} ;
13 if max{{C(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} > C(~x′) then
14 ~xα−max ← arg max{{C(~xα)}~xα∈~xe}, ~xα−max ← ~x′ ;
15 end
16 if C(~xbest) > min{{C(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} then
17 ~xbest ← arg min~x{{C(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} ;
18 end
19 cycle← cycle+ 1 ;
20 until the stopping conditions are satisfied ;
21 return ~xbest
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the neighbourhood of ~x:
~xf ← Fflip(~x, ): the onlooker bee randomly selects ′ elements in (0, 1) vector ~x and
flips them where 0 ≤ ′ ≤ .
To avoid infinite search loops, all visited positions are recorded in the tabu list ~x∗,and
the number of attempts is limited to nε.
After the local search, if the new positions bring more nectar amount (i.e.,less
cost), then the employed bees’ memory will be updated with the new positions of on-
looker bees. Next, a scout bee randomly selects a new food source position to replace
one of the previous positions which brings the highest cost. The search loops stop if
two conditions are satisfied: i) the number of iterations has reached Maximum Num-
ber of Cycles (MNC); ii) the resulting cost remains unchanged for nstable iterations.
The algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 3-4.
3.3.2 The QoS-Constrained Greedy Bees Algorithm for Utility Maximization
(QGBA-UM)
Similarly, we apply the QoS-constrained Bees Algorithm to achieve maximum
utility, which is detailed in Algorithm 5. QGBA-UM differs from QGBA-CM in that
the food positions of the employed bees are selected with probabilities proportional
to the corresponding utilities rather than the reciprocal of cost, and the employed
bees update their memory when the new positions bring higher utility rather than
lower cost. In addition, the scout bee updates one of the employed bees’ position
with the lowest utility rather than the highest cost. Their remaining parts are the
same. As there exit no more than MNC iterations, the time complexity of the hybrid
approaches are O(n2 +MNC · E · nε).
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Algorithm 5: The QoS-Constrained Greedy Bees Algorithm for Utility Maxi-
mization (QGBA-UM)
1 Apply QGA-UM and get corresponding result ~xbest ;
2 cycle← 1, ~xe ← {~xbest}, ~x∗ ← ~xe ;
3 the employed bees conduct the same global search and update ~x∗, ~xe as in
QGBA-CM;
4 repeat
5 foreach employed bee ~xα ∈ ~xe do
6 Lα ← U(~xα)
Σ1≤α′≤EU(~xα′)
· L ;
7 the onlooker bees conduct the same local search and update ~xα using
~xα,β with higher utility as in QGBA-CM;
8 end
9 Generate a scout bee ~x′as in the global search;
10 ~x∗ ← ~x∗⋃{~x′} ;
11 if min{{U(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} < U(~x′) then
12 ~xα−min ← arg min{{U(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} ;
13 ~xα−min ← ~x′ ;
14 end
15 if U(~xbest) < max{{U(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} then
16 ~xbest ← arg max~x{{U(~xα)}~xα∈~xe} ;
17 end
18 cycle← cycle+ 1 ;
19 until the stopping conditions are satisfied ;
20 return ~xbest
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3.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we implemented both the greedy approaches and the hybrid ap-
proaches in QSCM and QSUM, and evaluated their performance using metrics in-
cluding sensing cost, sensing utility, spatiotemporal coverage ratio and the number of
participants. All the simulations ran on a Windows machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU and 4 GB memory.
We assume the whole region of size 1000m×1000m is griditized into spatial blocks
of size 20m × 20m. Three hotspots are distributed in the whole region, and their
projections in the spatiotemperal space consist of 60×4, 60×5, 60×6 spatiotemporal
blocks similar to Figure 3.2. The spatiotemporal coverage ratio of each participant’s
trace tri over each hotspot STj is uniformly distributed over [0, 16%]. The number
of participants n varies from 10 to 30 with the increment of 10. We also assume the
participant pi’s static cost di is uniformly distributed over [1, 5] and its unit cost per
block bi is uniformly distributed over [1, 3], while the utility weight wj is uniformly
distributed over [4, 10]. In the hybrid algorithm QGBA-CM and QGBA-UM, we set
 = 3,ε = 3,nstable = 3, MCN = 6,E = 10, and L = 50. For simplicity, it is
assumed that the sensing applications have the same QoS requirement r for different
hotspots where r ranges from 10% to 100% with the increment of 10%. We generate
50 instances for each set of r and n and derive the graphs with error bars.
From Figure 3.3 we can learn that the hybrid approaches can derive better results
than greedy approaches with respect to both cost and utility. Specifically, the hybrid
approaches achieve the same results as the optimal solution when n = 10 as shown in
Figure 3.3(a) and Figure 3.3(d). It can be seen that the results of hybrid approaches
and greedy approaches are getting closer to the optimal results as r approaches 100%,
because the solution space shrinks with the increase of r. In addition, the gaps
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between the greedy approaches’ results and the optimal results become larger due to
the growing solution space as n increases from 10 to 30, while the hybrid approaches’
results keep close to the optimal results.
3.5 Discussions on Privacy-Preserving Task Assignment in MCS
In some cases, the CP can select the MDOs/participants with profiles that meet
the requirements of sensing service queries without knowing the exact numeric values
of their profile data, thereby offering a layer of privacy protection over the MDOs/-
participants. Li et al. [38] proposed to match the profiles of two users based on a
privacy-preserving computation of the intersection of their attribute sets, and the
techniques can be used to find appropriate MDOs/participants with profiles to match
the requirements of sensing service queries for sensing task assignment in MCS. In
addition, Ghinita et al. [39] designed a new method to compare two integers without
disclosing their values based on Paillier cryptosystem [40]. Accordingly, the CP can
divide a region into multiple convex polygon cells of which each side of each polygon
cell is represented by a line equation. As such, the CP can send the line equations of
a target cell in encrypted form to the MDOs/participants, while the MDOs/partici-
pants perform computations on the encrypted line equations with their locations and
send them back to the CP. Consequently, the CP can derive the signs of line inequal-
ities with the input of the locations of MDOs/participants and deduce which of them
lie inside the target cell without knowing their exact location coordinates. It can be
learned that Paillier cryptosystem is a very useful technique for privacy-preserving
task assignment in MCS. The details will be discussed in the next chapter.
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3.6 Related Work
Substantial research has been done for resource allocation and task assignment in
traditional sensor networks. A couple of efficient near-optimal algorithms are provided
in [41–43] to achieve a complete spatial coverage of the sensing field in wireless sensor
networks. Kallitsis et al. [44] constructed a resource allocation model based on pricing
scheme to maximize the provider’s utility with QoS requirements in network delay.
Koulali [45] et al. presented an optimal distributed relay selection policy to optimize
duty-cycling sensor’s energy consumption with QoS constraints on transmission delay.
Bagaria et al. [46] proposed a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to maximize
the lifetime of coverage of targets in a wireless sensor network with battery-limited
sensors. Two placement algorithms CSD-DC and CSD-NDC [47] are presented to
find a deployment curve to minimize the number of sensors while ensuring the barrier
coverage. Chen et al. [48] offered a novel algorithm maxL-minE to find a landmark
placement pattern to minimize the maximum localization error and demonstrated its
improved performance using Wifi and Zigbee networks in real building environment.
All of the work above are designed for static sensors while less work have been done
for mobile sensing. Reddy et al. [8] proposed a recruitment framework to maximize
the coverage-associated utility with budget constraint along with reputation-based
assessment. Yang et al. [49] designed incentive mechanisms in platform-centric and
user-centric models for mobile phone sensing. OptiMoS [32] devises a two-tier mobile
sensing model to balance sensor coverage and energy cost. Unlike previous work, we
identify the task assignment problems with QoS constraints in terms of spatiotemporal
coverage and propose efficient hybrid methods on top of the greedy algorithm and
bees algorithm to provide better performance.
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Figure 3.3: Evaluation Results of Different Approaches
3.7 Conclusion
The spatiotemporal coverage of the mobile sensing devices over the target areas
during time periods of interest has direct impact on the data quality and quantity
in MCS. We identify the problems of sensing cost minimization and utility maxi-
mization with QoS constraints to fulfil different requirements of sensing applications,
and propose greedy approaches as well as heuristic hybrid approaches with greedy
algorithm and Bees algorithms to address them. Our evaluation results show that
our hybrid approaches approximate the optimal solutions when the solution space is
small, and the results of hybrid approaches are more close to the optimal solutions
than the greedy approaches when the size of solution space grows large.
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Chapter 4
PRIVACY-PRESERVING SENSING QUERY AND MULTI-PARTY SENSING
COMPUTATION
The existing dynamics in MCS, which have found a growing popularity in the real-
world applications, is a promising direction to generate physical-world data and share
knowledge for the benefits of the academia and the industry. With the advent of MCS,
it is possible that people’s history of past activities could be recorded each second
with high accuracy and inspected by others, more and more attention have been
given to privacy leakage. The profiles and the daily traces of MDOs, which collect
and submit sensing data, could be harnessed by adversaries without permissions. At
the same time, the sensing queries of the SSCs also expose their interest. All these
privacy leakage, if not properly resolved, would impede the development of MCS.
To address the issues stated above, PP-MCS is proposed to protect the privacy of
MDOs and SSCs without relying on any online third party. It will exploit homomor-
phic encryptions to aggregate the private data of MDOs without revealing MDOs’
individual data records. An encryption scheme is defined as an additive homomorphic
one if and only if
E(m1)⊕ E(m2) = E(m1 +m2)
where ⊕ is an operator, and m1 and m2 are the numeric values to be encrypted.
Similarly, an encryption scheme is defined as a multiplicative homomorphic one if
and only if
E(m1)⊗ E(m2) = E(m1 ∗m2)
where ⊗ is an operator, and m1 and m2 are the numeric values to be encrypted.
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Specifically, we rely on Paillier cryptography [40] of which the most expensive
operations are encryption and decryption, while the operations with ciphertexts are
relatively inexpensive [39, 40]. Given the ciphertexts E(m1) and E(m2), the public
key pk = {g,N} and the secret key sk = {λ, µ}, the sum of m1 +m2 can be derived
by computing
D(E(m1, pk)⊕ E(m2, pk), sk) = (m1 +m2)modN
Additionally, we can derive the product r ∗m from the ciphertext operations based
on the multiplicative homomorphic property as follows:
D(E(m, pk)r, sk) = r ∗mmodN
where r is a random number.
4.1 Privacy-Preserving Sensing Query
4.1.1 System Model and Attack Model
Assume the SSCs request the summation/average values of the sensing readings
of some of the MDOs distributed across a large geographical area through the cloud
mediator. The system model is illustrated in Figure 4.1 and it consists of five parties:
• Sensing Service Consumers (SSCs): The SSCs are the sensing service con-
sumers to issue sensing service requests to the Cloud Mediator for the summa-
tion/average values of the sensing readings of some of the MDOs in a target
region. To preserve the privacy of the sensing requests, each SSC specifies a
cloaked ID set where the IDs of the real target MDOs are included, and gener-
ates its own public/private key pair based on Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt
its requests.
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• Cloud Mediator: The Cloud Mediator consists of both the SSP and the CP
where the MDOs register and get their IDs maintained. It forwards the en-
crypted sensing request to the MDOs specified in the cloaked ID set. Upon
receiving the sensing results, the Cloud Mediator aggregates the encrypted sens-
ing readings from the MDOs and forwards the aggregation result back to the
SSC.
• Mobile Device Owner (MDO): The MDOs encrypt the sensing readings upon
receiving the encrypted sensing requests and send them back to the Cloud Me-
diator for aggregation.
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Figure 4.1: Privacy-Preserving Sensing Query in MCS
We make the following security assumptions for the attack model: 1)The Cloud
Mediator and the MDOs are semi-honest attackers. In other words, they honestly
follow the procedures while they are interested in which MDOs that the SSCs try to
retrieve sensing readings from; 2) the data privacy of the MDOs are not concerned
in this scenario; that is to say, the identity of the MDO which a specific data record
belongs to is not important.
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4.1.2 Construction
In this subsection, we describe how to construct our privacy-preserving sensing
query scheme. We assume the Cloud Mediator hosts the registry including the sensing
categories, geographic locations and identification set I of all the MDOs for public use
where there exists |I| = n. Accordingly, the SSC selects the target MDOs I(t) with
appropriate sensing categories and geo-locations as well as a cloaking identification
set I(∗) of MDOs to hide the real target MDOs I(t), where there exist |I(t)| = n(t) ≤
|I∗| = n∗ ≤ n. Each MDOi holds the sensing reading di where there exist di < dmax
∀i ∈ I. Our scheme consists of three algorithms including Privacy-Preserving Query
Generation, Response Generation, Response Aggregation and Response Retrieval as
shown in Algorithm 6 — Algorithm 9:
Algorithm 6: Privacy-Preserving Query Generation (SSC)
1 The SSC randomly selects two large primes p, q such that N = pq > ndmax and
derives λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1) ;
2 The SSC also chooses a random g ∈ Z∗N2 , such that gcd(L(gλ mod N2), N) = 1,
where L(x) = (x− 1)/N ;
3 For each i ∈ I(∗), the SSC picks a random integer rl ∈ Z∗N2 and computes
ci =

E(1, pk) = g1rNi (mod N
2), if i ∈ I(t)
E(0, pk) = g0rNi (mod N
2), if i /∈ I(t)
4 The SSC transmits Q = {I(∗), c1, c2, · · · , cn∗ , pk} to the Cloud Mediator;
Correctness: For the target MDOi(i ∈ I(t)), its sensing reading would be em-
bedded into Ci = c
di
i = (g
1rNi (mod N
2))di = gdi(rdii )
N(mod N2). On the contrary,
for the MDOi(i /∈ I(t)), its sensing reading would be canceled out by computing
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Algorithm 7: Response Generation (Cloud Mediator + MDOs)
1 Upon receiving the encrypted sensing request Q from the SSC, the Cloud
Mediator looks up in the registry based on I(∗), and forwards (ci, pk) to MSCi
for all i ∈ I(∗);
2 On receiving (ci, pk), each MDOi encrypts its sensing reading di by computing
Ci = c
di
i , and sends it back to the Cloud Mediator as the response.
Algorithm 8: Response Aggregation (Cloud Mediator )
1 After receiving the response {Ci}i∈I(∗) from the all the MDOs, the Cloud
Mediator computes the aggregation result C =
∏
i∈I(∗) Ci;
2 The Cloud Mediator forwards C to the SSC.
Algorithm 9: Response Retrieval (SSC)
1 After receiving the aggregation result C from the Cloud Mediator, the SSC
performs the decryption to get the summation of the sensing reading values of
the target MDOs by computing
sum = Decrypt(C, sk) =
L(Cλ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N ;
2 The SSC further computes the average value of the sensing readings of the
target MDOs by computing ave = sum/n(t).
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Ci = c
di
i = (g
0rNi (mod N
2))di = g0(rdii )
N(mod N2). Hence, the aggregation of the
sensing reading values of the target MDOs can be computed by
C =
∏
i∈I(∗)
Ci =
∏
i∈I(t)
Ci ·
∏
i∈I(∗),i/∈I(t)
Ci = g
∑
i∈I(t) di(
∏
i∈I(∗)
rdii )
N(mod N2)
As a result, the summation of the sensing reading values of the target MDOs can be
derived by sum = Decrypt(C, sk) without any sensing reading values of other MDOs
in the identification set included.
Security Analysis:The Paillier cryptosystem offers semantic security [39, 40],
which is secure against chosen plaintext attacks. Therefore, given the public key pk of
the Paillier cryptosystem, the Cloud Mediator and the MDOs can hardly differentiate
between the ciphertexts c1, c2, · · · , cn∗ with encrypted ”0” or ”1”. Consequently, the
Cloud Mediator and the MDOs cannot distinguish the target MDOs I(t) from the
cloaked identification set I(∗). As a result, the privacy of the sensing query of the SSC
are protected.
4.2 Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Sensing Computation
In this section, we first present two techniques as the building blocks to preserve
the data privacy among two and multiple parties, respectively. Subsequently, we
construct a privacy-preserving scheme to protect MDOs’ data privacy in the procedure
of multi-party sensing computation.
4.2.1 Building Block I: Privacy-Preserving Comparision of Two Integers
The millionaire’s problem has bee proposed and addressed by Yao [50]. Its goal is
to solve the inequality ∆1 ≥ ∆2 without revealing the actual values of ∆1 owned by
Party A and ∆2 owned by Party B, respectively. Ghinita et al. [39] proposed an easy
solution to this problem based on Paillier cryptosystem with order of N . It assumes
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that ∆1,∆2 ∈ ZN ′ where N ′  (N − 1)/2. Party A generates the public/private key
pair pk/sk, and sends E(N−∆1, pk) to Party B. Accordingly, B generates a random
integer r ∈ Z∗M as a blinding factor where M ≤ b
N − 1
2N ′
c and computes
(E(N −∆1, pk)⊕ E(∆2, pk))r = E(N + ∆2 −∆1, pk)r = E(r(N + ∆2 −∆1), pk)
and sends it back to A. Subsequently, A decrypts this message and derives r(N +
∆2 −∆1). If ∆2 −∆1 ≥ 0, then r(N + ∆2 −∆1) ∈ I1 = {0, 1, · · · ,M ·N ′}, otherwise
r(N + ∆2 −∆1) ∈ I2 = {N −M ·N ′, · · · , N − 1} where I1
⋂
I2 = ∅
Ghinita et al. [39] pointed out this approach is feasible in real-world settings. It
suggested the magnitude of modulus N should be at least 768 bits large to guarantee
security strength, and values of ∆1 and ∆2 can be represented by 64 bits, which
suffice in most real-world applications. At the same time, the random blinding factor
domain will be bounded by M =
2768
2· 264 with the order of 2
700, which is sufficiently
large to provide a strong degree of security.
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Figure 4.2: Privacy-Preserving Integer Comparison in MCS
4.2.2 Building Block II: Secret Sharing Among Distributed Multiple Parties
Chase et al. [51] proposed a secret-sharing technique among n distributed parties
with n−2 collusion-resistance, which implies at least 2 out of n parties are outside the
collusion group. It assumes each pair of parties (i, j) share a secret sij where i, j ∈ Z∗N .
As such, each party i generates a function P (i) =
∑
j<i,j∈Z∗N sij −
∑
j>i,j∈Z∗N sij as the
blinding value such that there exists
∑
i∈Z∗N F (i) = 0. In this manner, any adversary
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who knows the secrets of no more than n − 2 parties cannot derive the secrets of
the remaining parties. This technique can be used to protect the data privacy in the
process of multi-party computation as detailed in the next section.
4.2.3 System Model and Attack Model
In this subsection, we only concern about the data privacy of the SSC and the
MDOs. Assume a SSC has a baseline value d, and some MDOs I = {0, 1, · · · , n} have
the sensing reading {di}i∈I and their absolute differences from d are {δi}i∈I = {|di −
d|}i∈I where |I| = n. The SSC is concerned about which MDOi have the absolute
difference between the sensing reading di and d above a certain proportion p1/p2 of the
summation of the absolute differences between all MDOs’ sensing reading and d where
p1, p2 ∈ Z and 0 < p1 < p2, such that ∆i = |di − d| ≥
p1
∑
i∈I ∆i
p2
, and which MDOi
have the sensing reading di with the absolute difference ∆di = |di − d| <
p1
∑
i∈I ∆i
p2
in Figure 4.2 without revealing d to any parties including the Cloud Mediator and
all of the MDOs. When p1 = 1 and p2 = n, it is reduced to the special case that
the SSC is interested in learning which MDOi have the sensing reading di with the
absolute difference above the average difference such that ∆i ≥
∑
i∈I ∆i
n
, and which
MDOi have the sensing reading di with the absolute difference ∆i <
∑
i∈I ∆i
n
.
We make the following security assumptions for the attack model: 1)The Cloud
Mediator and at most n − 2 out of n MDOs are semi-honest attackers. In other
words, they honestly follow the procedures, while the malicious MDOs are interested
in other MDOs’ sensing readings and the SSC’s baseline value d, the SSC is interested
in all MDOs’ sensing readings, and the Cloud Mediator is interested in both MDOs’
sensing readings and the SSC’s baseline value d; ii) the privacy of the sensing query
of the SSC is out of concern; iii)the MDOs are n − 2 collusion-resistant; in other
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words, at most n−2 out of n MDOs collude with the SSC and the Cloud Mediator to
breach the data privacy of the honest MDOs. We believe this assumption is feasible,
as most MDOs could be semi-honest while a few MDOs could be still honest in most
application settings.
4.2.4 Protocol
Without loss of generality, we assume there exists n MDOs in the system and each
MDOi has a sensing reading di ∈ [0, N ′]. For each di ∈ ZN ′ , it can be converted to a
binary vector ~di = {dˆi,0, dˆi,1, · · · , dˆi,N ′−1} where dˆi,k = 1(k ∈ [0, di]) and dˆi,k = 0(k ∈
(di, N
′ − 1]). The SSC has a baseline value d, and it generates Paillier public key
pk = (N, g) and private key sk such that nN ′  N . By the same token, d can also
be converted to a binary vector ~d = {dˆ0, dˆ1, · · · , dˆN ′−1} where dˆk = 1(k ∈ [0, d]) and
dˆk = 0(k ∈ (d,N ′− 1]). Similar to [52], we can derive the absolute difference between
di and d by computing
∆i = |di − d| =
∑N ′−1
k=0 |dˆi,k − dˆi| =
∑N ′−1
k=0 |dˆi,k − dˆi|2
=
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
i,k − 2
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆi,kdˆi +
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
i
=
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
i,k − 2~di~d+
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
i
Accordingly, the detailed operations of our protocol proceeds as follows:
I Query Generation The SSC generates sensing query as shown in Algorithm
10 :
II Response Generation: The cloud Mediator multicasts (pk, {E(dˆk, pk)}k∈[0,N ′−1])
to all the MDOs, and the MDOs generate response as shown in Algorithm 11 :
III Response Retrieval: For each Respi ∈ Response(i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}), the
SSC derives resulti = ri(
∑
j 6=i,1≤k≤n ∆j−(n−1)∆t) by decrypting Respt. If resultt ∈
[0, nN ′], then it indicates ∆di = |di − d| <
p1
∑
i∈I ∆i
p2
; otherwise if resultt ∈ (N −
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Algorithm 10: Query Generation (SSC)
1 The SSC constructs a vector ~d = {dˆ0, dˆ1, · · · , dˆN ′−1} where dˆk = 1(k ∈ [0, d))
and dˆk = 0(k ∈ [d,N ′ − 1]) based on its baseline value d;
2 The SSC picks a distinct random integer rk, r
′
k ∈ ZN and computes∏N ′−1
k=0 E(dˆ
2
k, pk) = E(
∑N ′
k=0 dˆ
2
k, pk) = E(d, pk) = g
drNk (mod N
2) and
E(dˆk, pk) = g
dˆkr′Nk (mod N
2) for each k ∈ [0, N ′ − 1] ;
3 SSC transmits (pk,E(d, pk), {E(dˆk, pk)}k∈[0,N ′−1]) to the Cloud Mediator.
nN ′ − 1, N − 1], then it indicates ∆di = |di − d| ≥
p1
∑
i∈I ∆i
p2
.
We herein explain the correctness of Algorithm 11 described above. Each MDOi
first computes the encrypted sensing reading difference E(∆i) without knowing the
real values of d and ∆i. Subsequently, the MDOs compute
Esum = E(
∑n
i=1(∆i + Pi), pk)
= E(
∑n
i=1(∆i +
∑
j<i,j∈Z∗N sij −
∑
j>i,j∈Z∗N sij, pk)
= E(
∑n
i=1 ∆i, pk)
Afterwards, Algorithm 11 takes n iterations to yieldResponse = {Resp1, Resp2, . . . , Respn}.
Specifically, for MDOt, we have
Respt = ((Esum)
p1 · E(∆t, pk)N−p2)rt2 · E(rt1, pk)
= E(rt2(p1
∑n
i=1 ∆i + (N − p2)∆t) + rt1), pk)
= E(rt2(p1
∑n
i=1 ∆i − p2∆t) + rt1), pk)
Accordingly, the SSC can derive rt2(p1
∑n
i=1 ∆i−p2∆t)+rt1 by decrypting Respt with
the secret key sk and infers the sign of rt2(p1
∑n
i=1 ∆i−p2∆t)+ rt1. For y = rt2x+ rt1
where x ∈ Z, it is self-evident that if x ≥ 0 then y > 0 and x < 0 then y < 0 because
of rt2 > rt1. Therefore, the SSC get the knowledge that if ∆i = |di − d| is smaller
than
p1
∑n
i=1 ∆i
p2
or not.
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Algorithm 11: Sensing Reading Difference Generation
1 Response = {Resp1, Resp2, . . . , Respn} ← {1, 1, . . . , 1}, Esum ← 1 ;
2 foreach MDOi ∈ {MDOi′}i′∈[1,n] do
3 The MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) constructs ~di = (dˆi,0, dˆi,1, · · · , dˆi,N ′−1) where
dˆi,k = 1(k ∈ [0, di)) and dˆi,k = 0(k ∈ [di, N ′ − 1]), and computes
E(di, pk) = E(
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
ik, pk) =
∏N ′−1
k=0 E(dˆ
2
ik, pk) = g
dirNk (modN
2) ;
4 The MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) selects distinct random integers {rik}k∈[0,di] where
rik ∈ Z∗N ′ and computes E(~d · ~di, pk) = E(
∑di
k=0 dˆkdˆik, pk)
=
∏di
k=0E(dˆkdˆik, pk) mod N
2;
5 The MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) further computes E(−2~d · ~di, pk) =
E((N − 2)~d · ~di, pk) = E(N−2)(~d · ~di, pk) ;
6 Consequently, each MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) computes E(∆i) = |di − d| =
E(
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
i,k − 2~di~d+
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
i ) = E(di, pk) · E(N−2)(~d · ~di, pk) · E(d, pk) ;
7 end
8 foreach MDOi ∈ {MDOi′}i′∈[1,n] do
9 The MDOi shares a secret sij with MDOj where i, j ∈ [1, n], j 6= i,
sij = sji ∈ Z∗N , and derives Pi =
∑
j<i,j∈Z∗N sij −
∑
j>i,j∈Z∗N sij ;
10 The MDOi computes Esum = Esum · E(∆i, pk) · E(Pi, pk) ;
11 end
12 The MDOn broadcasts Esum to all the MDOs;
13 foreach i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} do
14 The MDOi picks a random integer ri1, ri2 ∈ Z∗N ′ where ri2 > ri1 > 0, and
computes Respt = ((Esum)
p1 · E(∆i, pk)N−p2)ri2 · E(ri1, pk) ;
15 end
16 The MDOs transmit Response to the SSC through the Cloud Mediator.
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4.3 Approximate K-Nearest Neighbor with Privacy Preservation
The query for the k-nearest neighbors has significant implications in location-based
sensing scenarios, and the K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm can be used in numerous
fields of applications including classification and regression. In this section, we discuss
how to identify the k-nearest neighboring MDOs around a specific benchmark location
given by the SSC with the guarantee of the privacy window with the smallest size δ for
any MDOs in the worst case. Specifically, the locations of any MDOs remain hidden,
and the neighbors have no knowledge of their distance to the benchmark location,
while the distances between the benchmark location and any of its neighbors are
masked by privacy windows with the smallest size δ from the SSC.
4.3.1 System Model and Attack Model
The benchmark location provided by the SSC is L0 = (x0, y0), and the loca-
tion of each neighbor MDOi(i ∈ [1, n]) is denoted by Li = (xi, yi). Note the loca-
tions are derived from the latitude xi and the longitude yi which are both integers
(e.g.,(33.423856, 111.939575) → (33423856, 111939575)). Assume d∗ is the distance
threshold to separate MDO0’s actual k-nearest neighbors from other neighbors, and
we define a distance window δ for privacy preservation, such that the neighbors falling
within the distance range [d∗, d∗ + δ] can be taken as alternative ones equivalent to
some of the actual k-nearest neighbors. We believe this assumption holds as many
location-based sensing service applications are tolerant to location deviations to some
extent.
We make the following security assumptions for the attack model: 1)All the in-
volving parties are semi-honest attackers. In other words, they honestly follow the
procedures, but the SSC and the Cloud Mediator are interested in the neighbors’
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locations, and the neighbors and the Cloud Mediator attempt to pinpoint the bench-
mark location; ii) the SSC should not know the exact distances of the neighbors to
the benchmark location masked by the privacy window with the smallest size δ, and
each neighbor cannot learn its distance to the benchmark location.
Without loss of generality, we assume there exist xi, yi ∈ [1, N (L)]. For the sake
of security, the Cloud Mediator generates N (L), N (γ) where 2(N (L))2N (γ) ≤ bN − 1
2
c.
Accordingly, the Cloud Mediator calculates the distance array D = {D[k]}k∈[1,K] as
shown in Figure 4.3 (i.e., D = {0, 1,√2, 2,√5,√8, 3,√10,√13, · · · }) based on all the
possible distances within the range [0,
√
2N (L)]. At the same time, all the MDOs
agree on the minimum size wmin (e.g., wmin = 2) of the privacy window and make it
public. In each iteration of the process, the SSC privately updates the identity set Il,
which includes the indices of |Il| nearest neighbors where |Il| ≤ k, and it also privately
updates |Ir| , which includes the identity set the indices of |Ir| nearest neighbors where
|Ir| > k. The implication of N (γ) is described in the following part. Algorithm 12
elaborates how the SSC identifies k approximately nearest neighbors by narrowing
down the privacy window and the pivot pivot via a divide-and-conquer approach.
This algorithm adopts a binary search approach with complexity of O(logN). As D
is an already-sorted array and the maximal distance would not exceed N based on
the assumption, the complexity of this algorithm is O(n logN) where n is the number
of MDOs involved.
4.3.2 Construction
Correctness of Algorithm 12: We hereby provides the proof of the correctness
of Algorithm 12. Given (E(x20 + y
2
0, pk), E(x0, pk), E(y0, pk)), MDOi computes
E(−2x0xi, pk) = E((N − 2)x0xi, pk) = E(x0, pk)(N−2)xi , E(−2y0yi, pk) = E((N −
2)y0yi, pk) = E(y0, pk)
(N−2)yi , and derives E(∆i) = E((xi − x0)2 + (yi − y0)2, pk) =
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Algorithm 12: Approxiamte K-Nearest Neighbors with Privacy Window
1 The SSC generates Paillier public/private key pk = {g, n}, sk = {λ, µ} and
E = (E(x20 + y
2
0, pk), E(x0, pk), E(y0, pk)), and sends pk,E to Cloud Mediator ;
2 The Cloud Mediator initializes
−−→
sign = {signi}i∈[1,n] ← {1, 1, . . . , 1}, the loop
index t← 0, Il ← ∅ and Ir ← [1, n]. It also calculates all the possible distances
within the range [1, 16N (γ)(N (L))2] and derives the array D = {D[k]}k∈[1,K].
Accordingly, it initializes the privacy window ~w = {wleft, wright} ← [0, K − 1]
and publicizes (pk,E,
−−→
sign, t,D, ~w);
3 while the number of elements in
−−→
sign equivalent to 1 is not k do
4 The Cloud Mediator sets t← t+ 1, pivot(t) ← bwleft + wright
2
c ;
5 if |P| ≥ 1 and Diffmin(pivot(t),P) ≤ wmin then break end;
6 P← P ∪ {pivot(t)} ;
7 foreach MDOi ∈ {MDOi′}i′∈[1,n] do
8 MDOi computes E(−2x0xi, pk), E(x2i + y2i , pk), E(−2y0yi, pk) and
derives E(∆i, pk) = E((xi − x0)2 + (yi − y0)2, pk) just once; it also picks
random γ
(t)
i1 ∈ (1, N (γ)], γ(t)i2 ∈ [1, γi1), computes E(N −D2[pivot(t)], pk),
derives E(γ
(t)
i1 (∆i −D2[pivot(t)])− γ(t)i2 , pk) and sends it to the SSC ;
9 The SSC derives γ
(t)
i1 (∆i −D2[pivot(t)])− γ(t)i2 by decryption, and
updates signi as 1 if it is positive or −1 if it is negative ;
10 end
11 if more than k signi ∈ −−→sign is −1 then Ir ← {i|signi = −1, i ∈ [1, n]},
wright ← pivot(t) else Il ← {i|signi = −1, i ∈ [1, n]}, wleft ← pivot(t) end;
12 end
13 The SSC randomly picks k− |Il| MDOi where i ∈ (Ir− Il) and adds them to Il;
14 return Il ;
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of All Possible Distances
E(x2i +y
2
i +x
2
0+y
2
0−2xix0−2yiy0, pk) = E(x2i +y2i , pk) ·E(x20+y20, pk) ·E(−2xix0, pk) ·
E(−2yiy0, pk).
In t-th iteration, MDOi perturbs ∆i−D2[pivot(t)] by γ(t)i1 and γ(t)i2 where γ(t)i1 > γ(t)i2 .
As a result, if ∆i −D2[pivot(t)] > 0, there exists γ(t)i1 (∆i −D2[pivot(t)]) − γ(t)i2 > 0; if
∆i −D2[pivot(t)] ≤ 0, there exists γ(t)i1 (∆i −D2[pivot(t)])− γ(t)i2 < 0.
Accordingly, the SSC can derive n linear inequalities in t-th iteration as follows:
r
(t)
11 (∆1 −D2[pivot(t)])− r(t)12 ≶ 0
r
(t)
21 (∆2 −D2[pivot(t)])− r(t)22 ≶ 0
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· · ·
r
(t)
n1(∆n −D2[pivot(t)])− r(t)n2 ≶ 0
Given the array D = {D[k]}k∈[1,K] including all the possible distances, the goal of
the SSC is to find the privacy window [wleft, wright] with the minimum size |wright −
wleft| ≥ wmin where Il has the maximum number of MDOs when |Il| ≤ k and Ir
has the minimum number of MDOs when |Ir| > k . The first iteration starts with
[wleft, wright] = [0, K] and pivot
(t) = bwleft + wright
2
c. In the t-th iteration, if there
exists more than k linear inequality with ’<’ sign, wright should be decreased by setting
wright = pivot
(t) in the (t + 1)-th iteration; otherwise, wleft should be increased by
setting wleft = pivot
(t) in the (t + 1)-th iteration. The iterations stop when there
exists k linear inequality with the ’<’ sign or the privacy window size has shrunk to
wmin indicated by Diffmin(pivot
(t),P) ≤ wmin, which denotes the minimum difference
between pivot(t) and any element of P. Aside from the Il selected MDOs, the SSC
randomly selects another k − Il MDOs from the MDOs whose distances fall within
[D[wleft], D[wright], because we assume selecting any k−Il MDOs with distance within
[D[wleft], D[wright] approximate the real k−Il MDOs from the actual k-nearest MDOs.
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Figure 4.4: Search Process
Security of Algorithm 12: As the SSC keeps the private key sk, therefore it is
impossible for any MDOs to derive (x0, y0) or x
2
0 + y
2
0 due to the semantic security of
Paillier cryptosystem. Because the SSC keeps the signs of all the linear inequalities
hidden from the MDOs, the MDOs cannot get the knowledge of the approximate
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distances from (x0, y0), and thus this prevents them from narrowing down the possible
range of (x0, y0) by collusion.
Meanwhile, MDOi(i ∈ [1, n]) generates random γ(t)i1 and γ(t)i2 in the t-th iteration
to mask the value of ∆i −D2[pivot(t)] where γ(t)i1 > γ(t)i2 . As a result, it is impossible
for the SSC to derive ∆i with the known D
2[pivot(t)] due to the lack of knowledge of
γ
(t)
i1 and γ
(t)
i2 .
Meanwhile, the malicious SSC or the Cloud Mediator might manipulate [wleft, wright]
in the t-th iteration to get the knowledge of the exact distance from (x0, y0) to each
MDO. However, as [wleft, wright] and pivot
(t) are made public in each iteration, any
MDOs can easily check if the SSC or the Cloud Mediator honestly meet the fol-
lowing security requirements: i) [wleft, wright] and pivot
(t) are updated in a divide-
and-conquer manner correctly ii) the size of the privacy window Diffmin(pivot
(t),P)
decreases by iterations iii) Diffmin(pivot
(t),P) ≥ wmin. If not, this malicious behavior
can be detected immediately and any MDOs can decline to continue the process.
4.4 Experiment
The proposed privacy-preserving schemes are emulated on the DEll OPTIPLEX
390 desktop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-2100 CPU at 3.10GHz and 4GB memory
running 64-bit Windows 7 Enterprise. The whole processes are programmed on top
of the java version of Paillier cryptosystem provided by Kun Liu in UMBC [53]. The
emulations assess the computational cost of different scheme in terms of timing or
the number of iterations without considering the communication cost.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the results of privacy-preserving sensing query in section 2.1.
In the emulation, a random number |It| of the real target MDOs It are selected from
the cloaking identification set I∗ with the size |I∗| where |It| ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · 18} and
|I∗| ∈ {20, 30, 40}. The average computational cost of each customized selection is
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derived by running random selections with the same |It| and |I∗| for 10 times. It can be
learned that the average computation cost almost remains constant regardless of the
number of the actually selected MDOs when the size of the cloaking identification set
I∗ is fixed. This also proves the privacy preservation as the SSC cannot estimate the
number of the actually selected MDOs based on the computational cost. In addition,
the average computation cost increases with the size of the cloaking identification set
I∗ as more MDOs get involved into the computation process.
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Figure 4.5: The Average Computational Cost Regarding Different Number of
Target MDOs
Figure 4.6 illustrates the results of privacy-preserving multi-party sensing com-
putation in section 2.2. The emulation runs 10 times for each designated number of
involved MDOs. It can be learned that the average computation cost increases with
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the number of the involved MDOs, as the addition and the comparison of the sensing
reading of more MDOs would take more time.
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Figure 4.6: The Average Computational Cost Regarding Different Number of
Involved MDOs
Figure 4.7 illustrates the results of approximate k-Nearest Neighbor with privacy-
preservation in section 2.3. The emulation utilizes the distance array D = {0, 1,√2,
2,
√
5,
√
8, 3,
√
10,
√
13, · · · , 60√2} with 1446 elements under the assumption of 50
MDOs in total. The ranges for x and y coordinates grow from [0, 10] to [0, 60], and
the number of the nearest neighbors grows from 1 to 45. The emulation derives the
average number of iterations by running 10 times for each specified k and (x, y), which
are randomly selected from each specified coordinate range. It can be learned that
the average number of iterations needed gradually decreases as the coordinate range
grows from [0, 10] to [0, 60], because the density of MDOs would be reduced with the
fixed number of MDOs and it is easy for the divide-and-conquer approach to identify
59
the k nearest neighbors. For the designated coordinate range and the fixed number
of MDOs, the average number of iterations fluctuates around a certain value due to
the O(log(n)) complexity of the divide-and-conquer approach.
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4.5 Extensions
4.5.1 Private Participant Selection for Sensing Task Assignment in MCS
In MCS, appropriate MDOs with specific traits need to be identified for sensing
task delegation to achieve desired quality of sensing data. More often than not, the
SSCs are reluctant to disclose the specific traits of interest (e.g., the target region
or time periods). At the same time, the MDOs refuse to disclose their traits due
to privacy concerns, as those specific traits can be utilized to track and identify
themselves. This conflict becomes a thorny problem and degrade the accuracy of
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assigning sensing tasks to appropriate participants in MCS.
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Figure 4.8: An Example of Privacy-Preserving Participant Selection in MCS
Homomorphic Encryptions can be utilized to address this thorny problem by se-
cretly applying profile constraints, such that appropriate MDOs can be identified
without disclosing the exact traits of MDOs or profile constraints specified by the
SSCs. For the sake of simplicity, an example of location-related sensing task assign-
ment is given in the following. Assume a SSC is interested in some sensing readings
associate with a hexagonal cell with red edges as shown in Figure 4.8. The hexagonal
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cell can be defined by the following six lines in the following mathematical forms:
L1(x, y) : k1a1x+ a1y + c1
L2(x, y) : k2a2x+ a2y + c2
L3(x, y) : k3a3x+ a3y + c3
L
′
1(x, y) : k1a1x+ a1y + c1 − d
L
′
2(x, y) : k2a2x+ a2y + c2 − d
L
′
3(x, y) : k3a3x+ a3y + c3 + d
where d is the distance between any two parallel edges of the hexagonal cell, and
k1, k2, k3 are derived by rounding the slopes of L1, L2, L3 to the nearest integers,
respectively.
Accordingly, the SSC encrypts L1, L2, L3 and sends {E(a1, pk), E(c1, pk), E(a2, pk),
E(c2, pk), E(a3, pk), E(c3, pk), k1, k2, k3, d} to all MDOs. Subsequently, eachMDOi(i ∈
[1, n]) embeds its coordinates (x0, y0) into the line equation. Afterwards, eachMDOi(i ∈
[1, n]) selects random ri1, r
′
i1, ri2, r
′
i2, ri3, r
′
i3, ri4, r
′
i4, ri5, r
′
i5, ri6, r
′
i6 where ri1 > r
′
i1 >
0, ri2 > r
′
i2 > 0, ri3 > r
′
i3 > 0, ri4 > r
′
i4 > 0, ri5 > r
′
i5 > 0, ri6 > r
′
i6 > 0, computes
E(ri1(k1a1xi + a1yi + c1) + r
′
i1, pk), E(ri2(k2a2xi + a2yi + c2) + r
′
i2, pk),E(ri3(k3a3xi +
a3yi + c3) + r
′
i3, pk), E(ri4(k1a1xi + a1yi + c1 − d) + r′i4, pk), E(ri5(k2a2xi + a2yi +
c2 − d) + r′i5, pk),E(ri6(k3a3xi + a3yi + c3 + d) + r′i6, pk) to SSC for further checking.
This process is illustrated in Algorithm 13 . It is obvious to see that as long as
a1, a2, a3, c1, c2, c3 remain hidden, the MDOs cannot identify the hexagonal cell with
the already known k1, k2, k3, d.
4.5.2 Discussion on Parallel Computing in MCS
As MCS relies on potential millions of MDOs to feed the sensing reading into the
system, the computational overhead of the cryptographic operations of sensing read-
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Algorithm 13: Private Participant Selection
1 I← ∅ ;
2 The SSC generates {E(a1, pk), E(c1, pk), E(a2, pk), E(c2, pk), E(a3, pk),
E(c3, pk)}, and sends them with {k1, k2, k3, d} to MDOs ;
3 foreach MDOi ∈ {MDOi′}i′∈[1,n] do
4 The MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) constructs ~di = (dˆi,0, dˆi,1, · · · , dˆi,N ′−1) where
dˆi,k = 1(k ∈ [0, di)) and dˆi,k = 0(k ∈ [di, N ′ − 1]), and computes
E(di, pk) = E(
∑N ′−1
k=0 dˆ
2
ik, pk) =
∏N ′−1
k=0 E(dˆ
2
ik, pk) = g
dirNk (modN
2) ;
5 The MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) selects random ri1, r′i1, ri2, r′i2, ri3, r′i3, ri4, r′i4,
ri5, r
′
i5, ri6, r
′
i6 where ri1 > r
′
i1 > 0, ri2 > r
′
i2 > 0, ri3 > r
′
i3 > 0, ri4 > r
′
i4 >
0, ri5 > r
′
i5 > 0, ri6 > r
′
i6 > 0;
6 The MDOi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) further computes E(ri1(k1a1xi + a1yi + c1) + r′i1, pk),
E(ri2(k2a2xi + a2yi + c2) + r
′
i2, pk),E(ri3(k3a3xi + a3yi + c3) + r
′
i3, pk),
E(ri4(k1a1xi + a1yi + c1 − d) + r′i4, pk), E(ri5(k2a2xi + a2yi + c2 − d) +
r
′
i5, pk),E(ri6(k3a3xi + a3yi + c3 + d) + r
′
i6, pk), and sends them to SSC ;
7 if L1(xi, yi) ≤ 0 and L′1(xi, yi) ≥ 0 and L2(xi, yi) ≥ 0 and L′2(xi, yi) ≤ 0 and
L3(xi, yi) ≥ 0 and L′3(xi, yi) ≤ 0 then I← I ∪ {i} ;
8 end
9 return I.
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ing values in previous privacy-preserving sensing query scheme and privacy-preserving
multi-party sensing computation scheme are intensive. To provide sensing service in a
timely manner, it is critical to exploit existing parallel computing techniques to reduce
the processing time. Hadoop is a widely-used implementation of the parallel com-
puting model MapReduce, and it can be applied int both the two privacy-preserving
schemes to speed up the process without breaking the privacy.
In the privacy-preserving sensing query scheme, each MDO responds key-value
pairs on receiving the sensing requests. Assume there exist three MDOs MDO1,
MDO2, MDO3 and two sensing queries from two SSCs u1, u2 respectively. MDOi
sends a key-value pair < MDOi−j, C
uj
i > in response to the query from uj where
C
uj
i = c
di
j and cj = g
0rNj or g
1rNj . The mappers hosted by the CP take< MDOi−j, C
uj
i >
and output new key-value pair < uj, C
uj
i >. Each reducer takes the list of new key-
value pairs with the same key uj and produces the aggregation result < uj, C
uj >
where Cuj =
∏
i∈[1,3] c
di
j . This process is illustrated in Figure 4.9
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Figure 4.9: An Example of Privacy-Preserving Sensing Query Using Hadoop
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By the same token, in the privacy-preserving multi-party sensing computation
scheme, each MDO responds key-value pairs on receiving the sensing requests. As-
sume there exist three MDOs MDO1, MDO2, MDO3 and two sensing queries from
two SSCs u1, u2 respectively. MDOi sends a key-value pair < MDOi−j, E
uj
i > in
response to the query from uj where E
uj
i = E(∆
(uj)
i + Pi, pk). The mappers hosted
by the CP take < MDOi−j, E
uj
i > and output new key-value pair < uj, E
uj
i >. Each
reducer takes the list of new key-value pairs with the same key uj and produces the
aggregation result < uj, E
uj > where Euj =
∏
i∈[1,3]E
di
j . This process is illustrated
in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: An Example of Privacy-Preserving Multi-Party Sensing Computation
Using Hadoop
4.6 Related Work
Numerous techniques have been studied to secure the privacy of multiple-party
data computation and data sharing in sensing scenarios. Substantial research work
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[19,20,54] have been done for privacy protection by data perturbation or dummy data
generation and these incur significant overhead in mobile devices and decrease data
utility. Some other approaches adopt k-anonymity [16–18], which heavily depends on
the distribution and density of the mobile users, thereby rendering it impossible in
many real settings. Many other approaches [11–13,30] rely on a trusted third party to
host the individual data of mobile users for sensing query requests, and compromising
the third party can result in the breach of the private data.
Homomorphic Encryptions provide an important solution to privacy preservation
for multiple-party data computation and data sharing in sensing scenarios. Lin et
al. [55] addressed the issue of securing two-parties’ data comparison in a privacy pre-
serving manner by exploiting ElGamal encryption, Paillier encryption, 0-Encoding
and 1-Encoding. Erkin et al. [55] explored relatively efficient cryptographic privacy
techniques based on Paillier cryptosystem to allow spatial and temporal aggregation of
smart meter measurements. Privacy-preserving face recognition is also studied in [56]
and extensive experiments are done by running the standard Eigenfaces recognition
algorithm. Bilogrevic et al. [57] proposed two privacy-preserving algorithms for the
fair render-vous point problem with transformation functions based on homomorphic
encryption for location-based services. However, the distances to certain users are
exposed to multiple mobile users, and these mobile users can collude together to pin-
point the exact coordinates of the target victim. Ghinita et al. [39] first addressed the
issue of private comparison of two integers, and accordingly proposed approximate
and exact hybrid algorithms for private nearest-neighbor queries based on multi-level
index infrastructure and Voronoi cells. Nonetheless, the two algorithms rely on the
trusted location server to partition the two-dimensional plane into small convex poly-
gon areas first. Yi et al. [58] studied how to preserve the privacy of k-nearest neighbor
queries from the semi-honest location-based service provider based on Paillier cryp-
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tosystem. All the location data info have to be revealed to the location-based service
provider. The whole area is divided into small regions, and the location-based service
provider returns a cluster of cells with points of interest that could be more than k.
Choi et al. [9] addressed the issue of secure mutual proximity zone enclosure eval-
uation with homomorphic encryption and order-preserving encryption. Specifically,
it proposed two protocols, such that a client can securely determine her location is
enclosed in the proximity zone of a target, and the client learns if the target’s location
is within the client’s proximity zone, respectively.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how to preserve the privacy of the sensing query of the
SSC and the sensing readings of MDOs in MCS based on the homomorphic properties
of Paillier cryptosystem. It first present a privacy-preserving scheme such that the
real target MDOs in the sensing query are kept secret. Then it describes how to
privately compare the absolute difference between each MDO’s sensing reading and
a baseline value with a specified proportion of aggregated absolute difference of all
MDOs, followed by private identification of approximate k-nearest neighbors. Private
participant selection and the utilization of parallel computing are also discussed int
the extension.
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Chapter 5
PRIVACY-PRESERVING SENSING DATA ACCESS CONTROL IN MCS
In MCS scenarios, the MDOs yield data from ambient environment and store them on
the SSPs for the SSCs across different security domains to use. In some cases, the SSPs
are lack of means to validate the authenticity of the SSCs’ identity information, and
they may not have enough computation and storage resources to manage the online
setup of large volume of digital identities. Furthermore, the storage and management
of sensitive personal identity information incur overwhelming finance burden over the
startup SSPs with limited investment, as these SSPs have to deal with the personal
information with extreme attention. Otherwise, the leakage of personal identities and
associated personal proprietary resources could destroy the effort of the startup SSPs
to establish better brand recognition and incur unaffordable cost. Accordingly, the
startup SSPs are motivated to cut through the complexity and potential risk of main-
taining a large pool of identities by shifting the tedious task of identity management
to a few well-known third-party identity providers at the beginning.
In this chapter, we present our previous work, which could be applied to the
access control over SSCs to handle the issues mentioned above in distributed MCS
environment. Access to sensing services for SSCs should be allowed only based on
the pre-established trust between the SSCs and the SSPs, and the SSPs can only
place trust according to the identities and attributes of the SSCs. In fact, the fast-
growing online applications and services for smartphones boost the online setup of
mobile identities, and large quantities of identity setups have proven to be a finan-
cial and management burden for many start-up entrepreneurs. On one hand, since
smartphones store tremendous personal information about the individual users, the
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management of mobile identities must be handled with extreme caution as it is often
related to personal proprietary resources. On the other hand, there is a rising de-
mand on an open and federated mobile identity management system to facilitate the
access control of resource sharing between collaborating parties across heterogeneous
security domains. Therefore, these factors necessitate an open, comprehensive and
secure mobile access control system whereby different mobile service providers can
outsource the access control tasks and reduce the management cost.
A natural approach to address this problem is to leverage the existing feder-
ated identity management framework based on the concept of Identity-as-a-Service
(IDaaS). The federated identity management frameworks built on IDaaS, such as
OpenID [59], Centralized Authentication Service (CAS) [60] and Shibboleth [61],
emerges as widely-accepted solutions to integrate multiple identity service providers
and consumers together. The OpenID is an open standard for authentication dele-
gation as illustrated in Figure 5.1. It architects a framework in which the Identity
Provider (IdP) acts as a centralized authority by holding the identities and credentials
of the End Users (EU). When the EU interacts with the Relying Partiy (RP)(e.g.,
a website or application), the RP delegates the authentication process to the IdP.
Specifically, the EU provides the RP with his/her public OpenID identifier in the
form of URL or XRI (i.e., eXtensible Resource Identifier), and accordingly the RP
redirects the EU’s user agent to the IdP for authentication, and then the Identity
Provider sends back an assertion notifying the authentication result. In this man-
ner, the RPs can reduce the administrative burden of maintaining the vast amount
of digital identities and credentials, while the EUs can eliminate the frustration of
memorizing multiple pairs of username and password, thereby gaining more control
of their online identities. Please note that the concept of SSP is equivalent to RP ,
and the concepts of SSC, EU and MU are also equivalent.
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3-Login at IdP authentication webpage
4-Log into RP
5-Provide more information (optional)
Figure 5.1: The Security Issues in OpenID Framework
At with OpenID, CAS adopts a similar centralized approach as illustrated in
5.2. When the EU visits an application service requiring authentication, the service
redirects the EU to the CAS server with its service ID. Subsequently, the CAS server
validates the EU’s authenticity by checking his/her username and password against
a database, such as Active Directory, Kerberos or LDAP (i.e., Lightweight Directory
Access Control). If the authentication succeeds, the CAS server redirects the client to
the application service along with a security ticket while the EU can keep the cookie.
Afterwards, the application validates the ticket with the CAS server by providing the
ticket and its service ID. After the ticket is verified, the authentication is considered
successful and the EU is allowed to access this application service.
Shibboleth is another logging-in system for federated identity-based authentica-
tion and access control, and it adopts similar centralized approach as illustrated in
Figure 5.3. When an EU tries to access the resource hosted by a Sensing Service
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Figure 5.2: The Security Issues in CAS Framework
Provider (SSP), she would be redirected to Where-Are-You-From (WAYF) service to
select her own home organization. Afterwards, she is redirected to the home orga-
nization’s IdP and enter her credentials. After authentication, the IdP redirects the
EU back to the SSP along with assertion messages. The SSP validates the assertion
messages and it may also require additional attribute information from the IdP. On
receiving these attributes, the SSP makes the decision if the EU is allowed to ac-
cess the resources. Note that the authentication mechanism used by the IdP can be
OpenID, Kerberos, etc.
However, the federated identity management frameworks mentioned above are
prone to several security attacks. First of all, the IdP could be Honest-But-Curious
(HBC) and it can easily invade EU’s privacy, because the IdP will know all the RP-
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Figure 5.3: The Security Issues in Shibboleth Framework
s/SPs that the EU has been trying to log into, since the RPs/SPs have to delegate
the authentication requests to the IdP, and the RPs/SPs need to directly communi-
cate and verify with the IdP. Second, OpenID is vulnerable to SPOF. A single IdP
(e.g., Google) can become the central axis by undertaking the authentication tasks
for numerous RPs and EUs, and the crash of this IdP will imperil all the related
authentication and access control processes. For example, Google crashed for five
minutes with all its services on Aug. 16th, 2013, and this led to a 40% drop in
the global Internet traffic [62]. Even worse, once the IdP is compromised, all the
EUs’ credentials stored on this IdP are exposed to the attacker, which implies the
attacker can access the personal resources of each EU on all RPs/SPs. Last but not
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the least, the malicious RP/SSP can launch a phishing attack by directing the EU
to a bogus authentication webpage of a fake IdP. If the EU gives out her credentials,
then the malicious RP/SSP can access the personal information of the EU on all the
RPs/SPs. Likewise, the CAS framework suffers from similar drawbacks due to its
similar architecture and authentication procedures.
Moreover, those federated identity management frameworks do not fit well with
the collaborative environment wherein multiple authorities may dynamically cooper-
ate with each other to undertake the authentication and access control tasks. For
example, a joint lab co-founded by the computer science department and the biology
department only permits the access of the faculty and staff who are affiliated with
both of the two departments. A parking building allows the employees from any of its
sponsored corporations nearby to park. A local veteran association only allows the
veterans from several organizations to enter. In addition, the authorities might join
or leave at any time, and the RPs/SPs should be able to update the access policies
easily and minimize the impact of any changes.
To address the issues stated above, we propose a novel Distributed Privacy-
preserving Mobile Access Control (DP-MAC) framework based on the integration of
decentralized Attribute-Based Encryption (DABE) [63] and Identity-Based Encryp-
tion (IBE) [64]. In DP-MAC, the Sensing Service Provider (SSP) can create different
access policies and dynamically select multiple IdPs to undertake the tasks for mobile
access control whereby the SPOF issue can be solved. In addition, the IdPs are pre-
vented from tracking the mobile users’ historic access to SPs, because the IdPs are not
allowed to directly communicate with the SPs and they cannot infer which SSP the
user is trying to log in. A side benefit is that the phishing attack is eliminated as there
is no webpage redirection. Moreover, the system utilizes the Dual-Root Trust (DRT)
model wherein the Mobile User (MU) splits her secret credential into two parts, and
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stores them on the mobile device and the user-centric Mobile Cloud (MC) respec-
tively. Note that different users can freely select different cloud providers
(e.g., Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure) to be the MC and store their cre-
dential part, such that compromising any cloud platform has no impact
on the users on other cloud platforms and SPOF is mitigated. Hence, the
loss of mobile device does not cause identity theft, since both parts are indispensable
to validate the user in the process of mobile access control. Additionally, the major
computation cost is shifted from the resource-constrained mobile device to MC as a
result. To sum up, our contributions are four-fold as follows: 1) a new dependable
distributed framework with dual-root trust for mobile access control whereby the
SPOF problem is avoided and the threat of mobile identity theft is alleviated; 2) a
new mobile access control model to counter against HBC attack from IdP, thereby
protecting the user’s privacy with respect to the historic access information; 3) we
implement the mobile authentication system in mobile cloud platform and android
smartphones to prove its applicability in real-world settings.
• We architect a new distributed framework with dual-root trust for mobile ac-
cess control whereby the SPOF problem is mitigated due to multiple IdPs and
distributed MCs, and the threat of mobile identity theft is alleviated.
• We devise a new access control model to counter against HBC attack from
IdP, thereby protecting mobile users’ privacy with respect to the historic access
information.
• In DP-MAC, the SPs do not need to establish shared secrets with any IdPs,
and they do not maintain the credentials of any mobile users, thereby achieving
the maximum scalability in the distributed environment where the number of
IdPs and mobile users can grow exponentially.
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• We implement DP-MAC in mobile cloud platform and android smartphones
with jPBC [65] to prove its applicability in real-world settings.
On the other hand, in some MCS scenarios, a centralized sensing data access con-
trol mechanism is more favorable as it is easy for management. Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [66] is a milestone in cryptographic research
field in the past ten years. In CP-ABE, the centralized system can group the users on
the coarse-grained attribute level rather than the fine-grained identity level, thereby
enabling attribute associated group communications without ID involved and sig-
nificantly reducing the overhead. It provides an effective approach in sensing data
outsourcing and access control by encrypting data with attribute-based policies and
offering efficient access to multiple eligible SSCs with designated attribute constraints.
Without loss of generality, an attribute is a descriptive term and each data user owns
one or multiple attributes. The MDO creates access policies in a flexible way by
designating attribute constraints and embedding the data access policies into the ci-
phertext. Any SSC has to prove the validity of his attributes to access the data, and
thus SSCs data access privileges are determined by both their own attributes and
MDOs access policies. It is self-evident to see that CP-ABE also offers privacy as the
SSCs do not need to reveal their identities to access the encrypted sensing data.
However, the benefits also come with cost. As CP-ABE systems do not differ-
entiate individual SSCs on the ID level, it is very difficult to revoke any single SSC
based on his/her ID, and this has a negative impact on the deployment of CP-ABE
system in real-world settings. For example, if a SSC lost his/her electronic device
with private keys, then his/her identity must be revoked from the CP-ABE system.
In previous research work, all the SSC with the same attributes have to update their
private keys as a result, thereby causing tremendous system overhead. Therefore, in
this paper, a new ID-revocable technique in ABE systems is presented to revoke SSCs
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such that the existing keys do not have to be updated and the users with associate
attributes are not impacted. It is inspired by the revocation technology Lewko et.al
introduced in the broadcast encryption [67]. The structure style of the scheme still
follows Water’s CP-ABE scheme [68]. Basically, ID can be taken as a special attribute
owned by only one user in our scheme. In other words, each ID is a special attribute
that is mutually exclusive to any other IDs. The structure style of the scheme still
follows Water’s CP-ABE scheme.
5.1 Distributed Sensing Data Access Control
5.1.1 The DP-MAC Framework Design and Preliminaries
In this section, we presents the system model of DP-MAC and adversary model
as well as cryptographic preliminaries.
System Model
In DP-MAC, the mobile users can use credentials from multiple identity providers
without disclosing their historical access information of application services to the
identity providers. It utilizes a decentralized architecture as illustrated in Figure 5.4,
and consists of five components as follows:
• Distributed Public Key Generators (D-PKGs): The D-PKGs are trusted
parties to generate private keys for the Identity Providers based on their identity
strings in the system setup. After that, the D-PKGs go offline until a new
Identity Provider joins or leaves the system.
• Identity Provider (IdP ): An IdP is an entity that issues unique identifiers
to the registered mobile device users. It is responsible for authenticating the
mobile users for the Sensing Service Providers.
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• Sensing Service Provider (SSP ): The SSP is usually a website or an applica-
tion that provides services and resources for the mobile users. It delegates the
authentication tasks to the trusted IdPs to reduce its own overhead. Note that
the concept of SSP is equivalent to RP that appeared in the front part of this
chapter.
• Mobile Cloud (MC): The MC provide a dedicated virtual machine to the
mobile user for computation services and credential storage. It functions as
a middle-man between multiple IdPs and the mobile user to help reduce the
communication and computation cost of the mobile device.
• Mobile User (MU): The MU is the owner of a mobile device and she needs
to log into the SSP for sensing services and resources. The term Mobile User
(MU) is equivalent to Sensing Service Consumer (SSC) int this paper.
Adversary Model
We have the following assumptions: 1) Both the IdPs and MCs comply with the pro-
tocol and output the correct results; 2) The mobile devices perform secure execution
of trusted codes in trusted execution environment 3)Different classes of participating
parties do not collude together; 4) the communication between different classes of
participating parties are protected by secure channels. Accordingly, we consider the
following attacks in DP-MAC:
• Single Point of Failure (SPOF ): The DP-MAC system cannot proceed due
to the crash of any single party, which could be an IdP, a MC or a PKG.
• Honest But Curious (HBC): Both the IdPs and MCs honestly follow the
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Figure 5.4: The Architecture of DP-MAC
procedures, but they are interested in tracking the MU’s historical access infor-
mation to different SPs.
• Impersonation: The malicious SSP might leverage the received token to im-
personate the MU in the future mobile authentication and access control pro-
cedure. Meanwhile, the MU could be subject to identity theft due to the loss
of her mobile device.
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In section V, we will prove that our system is resilient against the attacks mentioned
above.
Cryptographic Preliminaries
Bilinear pairings are the basic operations in our framework. AssumeG andGT are two
cyclic groups with order q generated by a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter
generator G. Correspondingly we set up a bilinear map system S = (q,G,GT , e) where
e denotes a computable bilinear map e : G×G→ GT with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀G ,W ∈ G,∀a, b ∈ Z, e(Ga,W b) = e(G ,W )ab;
• Non-degeneracy: G and W are the generators of G, e(Ga,W b) 6= 1;
• Computability: e(G ,W ) is efficiently computable.
In our system,we set G = W and make G,G,GT public.
The cryptographic techniques of our system are constructed on top of IBE with
D-PKGs and DABE. IBE enables the encryptor to use the receipient’s identity string
(e.g., “bob@gmail.com||current-year”) as the public key to encrypt messages, thus
it eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure. DABE enables
the encryptor to encrypt data using a policy written over credentials across different
authorities between which there is no coordination. Therefore, the SSP can use
the IdP’s identity as the public key to encrypt some secrets, and send them to the
IdP through the mobile device and MU for authentication without worrying about
being tampered. Also, the SSP can dynamically select multiple trusted IdPs for
mobile authentication and access control by creating an access policy with LSSS
access structure [69, 70]. Consequently, even if some IdPs are compromised, the SSP
can easily adjust the authentication criterion by removing the impacted IdPs and
adding other IdPs.
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5.1.2 System Construction and Workflow
In this section, we describe how to construct our system and exhibit the workflow
in Figure 5.5. The most commonly notations are listed in Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.5: The DP-MAC Workflow
System Setup
In the system setup, the D-PKGs generates public parameters and computes private
keys for IdPs. The MU also registers at selected IdPs and MC with secret keys and
credentials. 1. Setup(κ,G, I) → (params, {di}Ii∈I): Given a security parameter κ,
a BDH parameter generator G and a collection I of IdPs, the k distributed PKGs do
the following steps:
1. Given a security parameter κ, it runs G to generate a prime q, G,GT of order
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Table 5.1: Notations
Notation Description
GIDu The unique ID of the mobile device (e.g., IMEI).
(k′, k)
the threshold of D-PKGs; k is the total number of PKGs and at least k′ of these
PKGs can derive the secret key.
I, Ii the IdP set and the i-th IdP in I.
IMU the set of the IdPs registered by the MU.
ISSP the set of the IdPs trusted by the RP in a mobile authentication and access control
process.
Imin the minimum subset contained in both IEU and ISSP that can satisfy the access
policy.
εj the master key share generated by the j-th PKG from the k
′ PKGs selected by the
IdP.
di,j the private key share generated by the j-th PKG from the k
′ PKGs selected by the
IdP Ii.
di the private key of the IdP Ii.
A a LSSS-based access matrix used by the SSP to select the trusted IdPs.
Ax the x-th row of A.
ρ(x) the mapping from Ax to IdP x.
s
a random secret generated by the SSP in a mobile authentication and access control
process; s ∈ Zq.
SKi = {αi, yi} the secret of the MU generated in the registration process on IdP i where αi, yi ∈ Zq
.
SKi,1 = g
yi the secret key share stored on the MC with respect to IdP Ii where g ∈ G.
SKi,2 = g
αi the secret key share stored on the MU’s mobile device with respect to IdP Ii .
Ki,u the credential of MU u stored on IdP Ii .
q so that there exists a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT .
2. Pick random generators P, g ∈ G and ε ∈ Z∗q. As with the distributed PKGs
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in IBE, each of the k PKGs keeps one share εj of a Shamir secret sharing of ε
mod q in a k′-out-of-k fashion.
3. Choose three cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3 such that there exist H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G∗, H2 : GT → {0, 1}n for some n, and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q. The public
system parameters are params = {q,G,GT , e, n, P, g, Ppub = P ε, H1, H2, H3}
4. Given the i-th IdP’s identity string Ii ∈ {0, 1}n, each IdP Ii selects k′ out
of the k PKGs to compute Qi = H1(Ii) ∈ G∗ and {di,j | di,j = Qεji }1≤j≤k′ .
Subsequently, the IdP Ii derives its private key by computing di =
∏
j d
aj
i,j =
Q
∑
j ajεj
i where the aj’s are the appropriate Lagrange coefficients.
5. The D-PKGs goes offline until any of the IdPs need to be revoked or a new IdP
joins the system.
2. MURegister(params, I) → {SKi,1, SKi,2, Ki,u}Ii∈IMU : In this process, the MU
registers at a subset of IdPs IMU ⊆ I. She also selects a MC at will and registers a
dedicated virtual machine. All the keys and credentials are computed in an oblivious
approach. The steps proceed as follows:
1. The MU selects multiple IdPs IMU ⊆ I, and registers a unique account on each
IdP with GIDu. For IdP Ii, the MU randomly selects αi, yi ∈ Zq as the secrete
key SKi = {αi, yi}, and stores the credential Ki,u = gαiHyi1 (GIDu) on IdP Ii.
2. The MU computes SKi,1 = g
yi for every selected IdP Ii and stores {SKi,1}Ii∈IMU
on a dedicated virtual machine of the selected MC.
3. The MU computes SKi,2 = g
αi for every selected IdP Ii, stores {SKi,2}Ii∈IMU
on the mobile device and discards the secret {SKi}Ii∈IMU .
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Mobile Authentication and Access Control
In this procedure, the MU and the SSP interactively negotiate to derive a minimum
subset of IdPs Imin to satisfy the SSP’s access policy. Afterwards, the MU provides
proofs to the SSP with the help of the MC, and the SSP sends the encrypted proofs to
the IdPs through the mobile device and the MC for validation. This process proceeds
as follows:
3. MULoginRequest(IMU , IRP )→ Imin: In this phase, the MU and the SSP coop-
erates to derive a minimum subset of IdPs from the intersection of the SSP-trusted
IdPs and the MU-registered IdPs to satisfy the access policy. The steps go as follows:
1. The MU sends a login request to the RP, and the SSP shows the EU its access
policy in the form of a boolean formula in terms of the trusted IdPs ISSP . For
example, the policy IdP1∧IdP2∧(IdP3∨IdP4∨IdP5)) implies the MU must
have registered at IdP1, IdP2, and one out of IdP3, IdP4 and IdP5.
2. The MU selects the IdPs she has registered, and they can derive the minimum
subset Imin such that Imin ⊆ (IMU
⋂
ISSP ) to satisfy the authentication criterion.
We do not discuss the details about how to derive Imin in this paper due to
page limits. If |Imin| = 0, then the login request is declined. Otherwise, the
authentication and access control process proceeds.
4. GenToken(params, {SKx,1, SKx,2}Ix∈Imin) → token2: In this phase, the SSP
requests the validation that the MU has registered at the IdPs in Imin, and the MU
produces the proof with the help of the MC as follows:
1. The MU invokes the RESTful service running on the MC through SSL/TLS.
The MC computes and transfers token1 = {grx,1 , SKrx,1x,1 }Ix∈Imin to the MU by
randomly selecting rx,1 ∈ Zq.
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2. Upon receiving token1, the MU randomly selects rx,2 ∈ Zq, and then computes
token2 = {grx,1 , SKrx,1rx,2x,1 , SKrx,2x,2 , }Ix∈Imin and {C ′2,x = grx,1rx,2}Ix∈Imin . Subse-
quently, it transfers token2 to the SSP but keeps {C ′2,x}Ix∈Imin .
5. GenChallenge(params, token2)→ challenge′. In this phase, the SSP generates
and transfers a challenge to the IdPs through the MU and the MC as follows:
1. On receiving token2, the SSP picks a random number s ∈ Zq to compute C0 =
e(g, g)s for validation in the end. It also selects a random vector v ∈ Zlq with
s as its first entry, and a random vector w ∈ Zlq with 0 as its first entry. We
use Ax to denote the row x of A. For each row Ax, it picks a random secret
Rx ∈ {0, 1}m, and calculates λx = Ax · v, wx = Ax · w and rx,3 = H3(Rx),
thereby deriving the challenge message as below:
challenge = (A, {C1,x, C3,x, C4,x}Ix∈Imin),
where
C1,x = e(g, g)
λxe(grx,1 , SK
rx,2
x,2 )
rx,3
= e(g, g)λxe(g, g)αρ(x)rx ,
C3,x = SK
rx,1rx,2rx,3
x,1 g
wx = gyρ(x)rxgwx ,
C4,x = {P r∗x , Rx ⊕H2(gr
∗
x
x )},
and rx = rx,1rx,2rx,3, gx = e(H1(Ix), Ppub).
2. The SSP sends challenge to the MC through the MU, and the MU derives
challenge′ = (A, {C1,x, C ′2,x, C3,x, C4,x}Ix∈Imin) by appending {C ′2,x}Ix∈Imin and
transfers it to the MC. The MC splits and forwards the corresponding part of
challenge′ to each selected IdP respectively.
6. GenResponsex(params, challenge′) → responsex: In this phase, each IdP Ix
performs an initial decryption over the challenge and outputs responsex as follows:
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1. The IdP Ix derives rx,3 by applying IBE decryption to C4,x with its private key
dx:
Rx ⊕H2(gr
∗
x
x )⊕H2(e(dx, P r∗x))
= Rx ⊕H2(e(H1(Ix), Ppub)r∗x)⊕H2(e(dx, r∗xP ))
= Rx ⊕H2(e(H1(Ix), P ε)r∗x)⊕H2(e(Hε1(Ix), P r∗x))
= Rx
and retrieves rx,3 = H3(Rx) thereafter. Then it derives C2,x = (C
′
2,x)
rx,3 = grx .
2. Subsequently, the IdP Ix looks up GIDu in the registered user table, and com-
putes responsex:
C1,x · e(H1(GIDu), C3,x)
e(Kρ(x),u, C2,x)
=e(g, g)λxe(H1(GIDu), g)
wx which is then sent back to
the MC.
7. GenResponse(params, {responsex}Ix∈Imin) → response: In this phase, the MC
completes the final decryption as below:
1. Upon receiving responsex from each IdP x, the MC selects constants cx ∈ Zq
such that
∑
x cxAx = (1, 0, · · · , 0). Thereafter it computes response as below:∏
x
(e(g, g)λxe(H1(GIDx), g)
wx)cx
?
= e(g, g)s
′
.
2. the MC sends response to the SSP through the MU.
8. Verification the SSP verifies response against C0. If they are equal, then the
MU is granted the access to log in; otherwise the MU’s access request is rejected.
5.1.3 Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we provide the security assessment and the evaluate results re-
garding the participating parties.
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Security Analysis
As the security of DP-MAC mainly relies on IBE and DABE, its security strength
can be also proved using the same proofs in [64] and [63]. In addition, we use the two
assumptions below to ensure the security in the following part.
DEFINITION 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem(DLP) Assumption). Given g, gx ∈ G
where x ∈ Z∗n, then for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A and
negligible ε, we have Pr[A(g, gx) = x] ≤ ε.
DEFINITION 2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem(DDH)). Given a randomly
chosen 4-tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4 with a, b ∈ Z∗n to determine whether c = ab or not.
The DDH assumption holds in G if no PPT algorithm A has non-negligible advantage
ε in solving the DDH problem in G.
Theorem 1: DP-MAC is secure against the authentication spoofing attack com-
mitted by the MU.
Proof: DP-MAC ensures that the MU cannot prove her authenticity alone with-
out delegating the authentication tasks to all the IdPs required by the access policy.
In practice, the MU is motivated to spoof the SSP that she has been authenticated
by all the target IdPs, which is not the truth. Nonetheless, the SSP generates a
blinding factor Rx for each IdP Ix, and forwards it to the IdP Ix through the MU
and the MC after encrypting it with Ix’s public key. The cryptographic strength of
IBE prevents the MU and her dedicated virtual machine from deriving Rx without
the help of Ix. As such, the MU cannot derive C2,x, and the cryptographic strength
of DABE ensures that the MU cannot compute the correct response for validation
without the knowledge of C2,x. In addition, given C1,x, C3,x and token2, the blinding
factor Rx prevents the MU from deducing e(g, g)
λx and gwx due to the hardness of
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DLP. As a result, the MU cannot derive the correct response and authenticate herself
to the SSP.
Theorem 2: DP-MAC is secure against the impersonation attack launched by
the SSP.
Proof: DP-MAC ensures that the malicious SSP cannot impersonate an au-
thenticated MU with all the information in prior authentication and access control
process. In actuality, the malicious SSP might impersonate the MU in previous au-
thentication process to get validation from the RP in a new authentication process by
reusing the received token2. Nevertheless, the MU didn’t disclose C
′
2,x = g
rx,1rx,2 to
the malicious SSP, and the SSP has to derive C ′2,x in order to be successfully authen-
ticated due to the cryptographic strength of DABE. Note that token2 takes the form
of {grx,1 , gyxrx,1rx,2 , gαirx,2}, and the unknown yx renders it impossible for the SSP to
derive grx,1rx,2 from gyxrx,1rx,2 . Assume the malicious SSP has made a successful guess
of grx,2 from gαirx,2 , the hardness of DDH ensures that the SSP can derive grx,1rx,2
from grx,1 and grx,2 with a negligible probability in polynomial time. Hence DP-MAC
prevents the SSP from launching any impersonation attacks against the MU.
Furthermore, the decentralized architecture enables DP-MAC to be robust to-
wards the fault of any system component, and thus it mitigates the SPOF problem.
Also, k′ out of k PKGs are employed to generate secret key for IdP, and the adversary
cannot get any advantage if less than k′ PKGs are compromised. Note that the MU
can register a dedicated virtual machine in any cloud, and the corruption of one cloud
platform wouldn’t impact other MUs in other cloud platforms.
In addition, DP-MAC protects the privacy of the MU against HBC attacks from
the IdPs, because the SSP delegates the authentication and access control to the IdPs
through MU without direct interactions with IdPs, and the challenge messages do not
contain any information about the SSP. Both the IdPs and the MC cannot gain any
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Figure 5.6: The Computational Cost in System Setup Phase
knowledge about the SSP, as the MU is placed between the MC and the SSP, and it
cannot infer the SSP from the tokens and the challenge messages.
Last but not the least, DP-MAC can prevent identity theft in case of mobile device
loss, because the adversary cannot establish SSL/TLS channel with the dedicated
virtual machine in the MC, such that it is unable to complete the authentication and
access control process using SKx,2 only.
Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, we implement DP-MAC in Mobicloud [71] and android smart-
phone. The MU uses Samsung Galaxy Nexus with Dual core ARM Cortex-A9 at
1.2GHz and 1GB memory running Android 4.2 (Jelly Bean), and the other par-
ticipating parties are simulated by virtual machines with Intel Core i3-2100 CPU at
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Figure 5.7: The Computational Cost in Authentication and Access Control Phase
3.10GHz and 2GB memory running 64-bit Ubuntu Lucid Lynx (Ubuntu 10.04) hosted
by Mobicloud. The experiment utilizes Java Pairing-Based Cryptography (jPBC) li-
brary [65] based on Type-A ECC curve which features the fastest group operation.
It is on the supersingular curve y2 = x3 + x over the 512-bit finite field.
From Figure 5.6 it can be seen that as the number of associated IdPs grow from
1 to 6, the computation time of D-PKGs increases from 35 milliseconds to 109 mil-
liseconds, while the computation time of the MU for generating credential and secret
keys in MURegister increases from 1176 milliseconds to 5473 milliseconds. As the
algorithms in the system setup phase run only one time, the computational over-
head of the MU are acceptable in real life, as the users are unlikely to register at
too many IdPs. Figure 5.7 illustrates the computational overhead in the authenti-
cation and access control phase. We do not consider the time cost resulting from
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MULoginRequest and V erification, as they do not involve any cryptographic oper-
ations, which are computation-intensive. It can be seen that as the number of selected
IdPs grow from 1 to 6, the computation time of MC increases from 29 milliseconds
to 155 milliseconds, and the computation time of the SSP increase from 80 millisec-
onds to 426 milliseconds, while that of the MU grows from 671 milliseconds to 5098
seconds. The computation time of IdPs on average keeps around 45 milliseconds.
We believe the computational cost is acceptable for the MU, as this is only one-time
authentication and access control phase, and the MU can be assigned a session key
by the SSP to perform symmetric encryption after validation.
5.2 Centralized Sensing Data Access Control
The ID-revocable ABE scheme has the same cryptographic preliminaries as those
in DP-MAC. Bilinear pairings are the basic operations and linear secret sharing are
utilized in ID-revocable ABE. Assume G and GT are two cyclic groups with order q
generated by a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter generator G. Correspond-
ingly a bilinear map system S = (q,G,GT , e) could be set up where e denotes a
computable bilinear map e : G×G→ GT .
In the following, it is first presented as single-ID revocation version, followed by
multiple-ID revocation version. It is comprised of four algorithms, and the implica-
tions of the algorithms in ID-revocable ABE are elaborated as below:
• Setup(U , I): Given an identity set I and an attribute set I, the trust authority
publishes its public key PK but keep its master key MSK ;
• KeyGen(MSK,S, ID): Given MSK, SSC’s ID and attribute set S, the trust
authority issues private keys SK;
• Encrypt(PK, (M,ρ),M, {IDj}): Given the public key PK, the LSSS matrix
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M and its corresponding mapping ρ to each attribute, the messageM and the
revoked ID set {IDj}, the MDO generates the ciphertext and send it to the
Cloud Provider;
• Decrypt(CT, SK): Given the ciphertext CT , the SSC derives the message M
by decrypting with its private key SK.
5.2.1 Security Model
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters,
PK to the adversary.
• Phase1. The adversary makes repeated private keys query corresponding to
sets of attributes P1, ..., Pq1 where each attribute set is owned by an entity with
identity ID.
Challenge: The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1. In ad-
dition the adversary gives a challenge access structure A∗ and a set S of revoked
identities such that S must include all identities that were queried and none of the
sets P1, ...,Pq1 from Phase 1 satisfy the access structure if its owner identity is not
involved in S. The challenger picks up a random coin b, and encrypts Mb under the
access structure A∗ and . The ciphertext CT is given to the adversary.
• Phase2. Phase 1 is repeated with the restriction that none of sets of attributes
Pq1+1, ...,Pq where the corresponding owner’s identity ID is not in S satisfy the
access structure corresponding to the challenge or the corresponding owner’s
identiy is in the revocation set S.
Guess The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
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The advantage of an adversary A in this game is defined as Pr[b′ = b] − 1. We
note that the model can easily be extended to handle chosen-ciphertext attacks by
allowing for decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2.
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is secure if all polynomial
time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game. We say that
a system is selectively secure if we add an Init stage before setup where the adversary
commits to the challenge access structure A∗ and the revocation ID set S. All of our
constructions will be proved secure in the selective security model.
5.2.2 Assumptions
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption The decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman problem is defined as follows. We choose a group G of prime order p and
a random generator g of G and random exponents c1, c2, c3 ∈ Zp. Given −→y =
{g, gc1 , gc2 , gc3}, it is hard for the attacker to distinguish e(g, g)c1c2c3 ∈ GT .
An algorithm B that outputs z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage  in solving decisional BDH
in G if
|Pr[B(−→y , T = e(g, g)c1c2c3) = 0]− Pr[B(−→y , T = R) = 0]| ≥ 
The decisional BDH assumption holds if only negligible advantage exists for any
algorithm to solve the decisional BDH problem in polynomial time.
q-Decisional Multi-Exponent Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption We herein
make an assumption named the q decisional Multi-Exponent Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption to prove the security and it is defined as follows. We select a group
G of prime order p. A challenger picks a generator g ∈ G and random exponents
s, α, α1, α2, · · · , αq. Given
g, gs, e(g, g)α, {gαi , gαis, gαiαj , gα/α2i , }1≤i,j≤q, {gαiαjs, gααj/α2i , gααiαj/α2k , gαα2i /α2j}1≤i,j,k≤q,i6=j
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it remains hard for the attacker to distinguish e(g, g)αs ∈ GT from a random
element in GT .
An algorithm B that outputs z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage  in solving decisional
q-parallel BDHE in G if
|Pr[B(−→y , T = e(g, g)αs) = 0]− Pr[B(−→y , T = R) = 0]| ≥ 
These four algorithms are detailed in the following subsections.
5.2.3 CP-ABE Scheme with single ID Revocation
The following presents the construction of centralized CP-ABE with one ID revo-
cation.
a. Setup(U , I)
The algorithm takes an attribute set U and an identity set I as input where
|U| = m and |I| = n. It chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator p and m
random group elements h1, h2, · · · , hm ∈ G that are associated with the m attributes
in the system. It also chooses random exponents α, b ∈ Zp.
Therefore, the public keys are output as:
PK = {g, gb, gb2 , e(g, g)α, hb1, · · · , hbm}
The Master secret key
MSK = {α, b}
b. KeyGen(MSK,S, ID)
S is the attribute set of user ID ∈ I. The algorithm chooses a random t ∈ Zp
and derive the secret keys as follows:
SK = (K = gαgb
2t, {Kx = (gb·IDhx)t}∀x∈S, L = g−t)
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c. Encrypt(PK, (M, ρ),M, IDj) It takes the input as an LSSS access infrastruc-
ture (M,ρ) and the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes. IDj is assumed
to be the identity which will be revoked. Let M be an l × n′ matrix. The algorithm
first chooses a random vector v = (s, y2, · · · , yn′) ∈ Zn′p . These values will be used
to share the encryption exponent s. For x ∈ [1, l], it calculates λx = v ·Mx, where
Mx is the vector corresponding to the x-th row of M . The algorithm chooses random
r1, · · · , rl ∈ Zp. It generates the first part of ciphertext:
C =Me(g, g)αs, C0 = gs, Cˆ = {C∗1 = gb·λ1 , C ′1 = (gb
2·IDjhbρ(1))
λ1 , · · · ,
C∗l = g
b·λl , C ′l = (g
b2·IDjhbρ(l))
λl}
d. Decrypt(CT,SK) CT = (C,C0, Cˆ, (M,ρ)) is the input ciphertext and SK
is a private key for a set S. Suppose that S satisfies the access structure and let
I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set of
constants such that if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s according to M , then
Σi∈Iωiλi = s. If the identity ID combined in the SK is not equal to the revocation
identity IDj in the ciphertext, this step proceeds as follows:
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e(C0, K)
(
∏
i∈I
[e(Kρ(i), C
∗
i ) · e(L,C ′i)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(gs, gαgb
2t)
(
∏
i∈I
[e((gb·IDhρ(i))t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, (gb2·IDjhbρ(i))λi)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(gs, gα) · e(gs, gb2t)
(
∏
i∈I
[e(gb·ID·t, gb·λi) · e(htρ(i), gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb
2·IDj ·λi) · e(g−t, hb·λiρ(i))]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I
[e(gb·ID·t, gb·λi) · e(g−t, gb2·IDj ·λi)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I
[e(g, g)b
2tλi(ID−IDj)]ωi)1/(ID−IDj)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
(
∏
i∈I
e(g, g)b
2tλiωi)
=
e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)b2st
e(g, g)b
2t
∑
i∈I λiωi
= e(g, g)αs
From the algorithms described above, it can be learned that the size of the ci-
phertext grows linearly with the number of involved attributes. In addition, both the
encryption and decryption cost also increase in proportion to the number of involved
attributes.
5.2.4 CP-ABE Scheme with Multiple IDs Revocation
The following describes the construction of centralized CP-ABE with multiple ID
revocation.
a. Setup(U , I)
The algorithm takes an attribute set U and an identity set I as input where
|U| = m and |I| = n. It chooses a group G of prime order p, a generator p and m
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random group elements h1, h2, · · · , hm ∈ G that are associated with the m attributes
in the system. It also chooses random exponents α, b ∈ Zp.
Therefore, the public keys are output as:
PK = {g, gb, gb2 , e(g, g)α, hb1, · · · , hbm}
The Master secret key
MSK = {α, b}
b. KeyGen(MSK,S, ID)
S is the attribute set of user ID ∈ I. The algorithm chooses a random t ∈ Zp
and derive the secret keys as follows:
SK = (K = gαgb
2t, {Kx = (gb·IDhx)t}∀x∈S, L = g−t)
c. Encrypt(PK, (M, ρ),M,S) It takes the input as an LSSS access infrastruc-
ture (M,ρ) and the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes. IDj is assumed
to be the identity which will be revoked. Let M be an l × n′ matrix. The algorithm
first chooses a random vector v = (s, y2, · · · , yn′) ∈ Zn′p . These values will be used to
share the encryption exponent s. For x ∈ [1, l], it calculates λx = v ·Mx, where Mx is
the vector corresponding to the x-th row of M . Let r = |S| and IDj denote the j-th
identity in S. The algorithm chooses random µ1, ..., µr ∈ Zp such that µ = µ1+...+µr.
It generates the first part of ciphertext:
C =Me(g, g)αsµ, C0 = gsµ
C∗1,1 = g
b·λ1µ1 , C ′1,1 = (g
b2·ID1hbρ(1))
λ1µ1 · · · C∗l,1 = gb·λlµ1 , C ′l,1 = (gb2·ID1hbρ(l))λlµ1
C∗1,2 = g
b·λ1µ2 , C ′1,2 = (g
b2·ID2hbρ(1))
λ1µ2 · · · C∗l,2 = gb·λlµ2 , C ′l = (gb2·ID2hbρ(l))λlµ2
· · ·
C∗1,r = g
b·λ1µr , C ′1,r = (g
b2·IDrhbρ(1))
λ1µr · · · C∗l = gb·λlµr , C ′l,r = (gb2·IDrhbρ(l))λlµr
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d. Decrypt(CT,SK) CT is the input ciphertext with access structure (M,ρ)
and SK is a private key for a set S. Suppose that S satisfies the access structure
and let I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Let {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I be a set
of constants such that if {λi} are valid shares of any secret s according to M , then
Σi∈Iωiλi = s. If the identity ID combined in the SK is not equal to the revocation
identity IDj in the ciphertext, we can perform
e(C0, K)∏
i∈I
(
r∏
j=1
[e(Kρ(i), C
∗
i,j) · e(L,C ′i,j)]1/(ID−IDj))ωi
=
e(gsµ, gαgb
2t)∏
i∈I
(
r∏
j=1
[e((gb·IDhρ(i))t, gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, (gb2·IDjhbρ(i))λiµj)]1/(ID−IDj))ωi
=
e(gsµ, gα) · e(gsµ, gb2t)∏
i∈I
(
r∏
j=1
[e(gb·ID·t, gb·λiµj) · e(htρ(i), gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, gb
2·IDj ·λiµj) · e(g−t, hb·λiµjρ(i) )]1/(ID−IDj))ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I
(
r∏
j=1
[e(gb·ID·t, gb·λiµj) · e(g−t, gb2·IDj ·λiµj)]1/(ID−IDj))ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I
(
r∏
j=1
[e(g, g)b
2tλiµj(ID−IDj)]1/(ID−IDj))ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I
(
r∏
j=1
e(g, g)b
2tλiµj)ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt∏
i∈I
(e(g, g)
(
∑r
j=1
µj)b
2tλi)ωi
=
e(g, g)αsµ · e(g, g)b2sµt
e(g, g)b
2tµ
∑
i∈I λiωi
= e(g, g)αsµ
From the algorithms described above, it can be learned that the size of the ci-
phertext grows linearly with the product between the number of involved attributes
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and the number of revoked IDs. In addition, both the encryption and decryption cost
also increase in proportion to the product between the number of involved attributes
and the number of revoked IDs.
5.2.5 Security Proof
THEOREM 2. Suppose the decisional q-MEBDH assumption holds. Then no poly-
time adversary can selectively break our system with a ciphertext encrypted to r∗ ≤ q
revoked users.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A with non-neglibile advantage  = AdvA in
the selective security game against our scheme. Moreover, suppose A attacks our
construction with a ciphertext of at most q revoked users. We show how to build
simulator,B,that plays the decisional q-MEBDH problem.
Init The simulator takes in q-MEDDH challenge
−→
X,T . Then the adversary gives the
simulator algorithm a revocation set S∗ = ID1, ..., IDr∗ of size r∗ ≤ q.
Setup The simulator chooses random a1, a2, ..., ar∗ and implicitly sets b = a1 + a2 +
· · ·ar∗ by computing the public parameters as
g, gb =
∏
1≤i,j≤r∗
gai , gb
2
=
∏
1≤i,j≤r∗
(gai·aj)
To reflect the revocation set S∗ in the public parameters h1, ..., hU , the algorithm
chooses a random value zx for each x for 1 ≤ x ≤ U . Let X denote the set of indices
i, such that ρ(i) = x. We program hx as
hx =
∏
1≤i≤r∗
g−aiID · gzx
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Then the simulator publishes the above parameters (g, gb, gb
2
, hb1, h
b
2, ..., h
b
U , e(g, g)
α)
as public key. We observe that the public parameters are distributed randomly as
the real system.
Phase I The algorithm simulates to answer private key queries. To construct all
private keys in the revocation set S∗, the simulator chooses a random value θi for each
identity IDi and implicitly set the randomness ti of the i-th identity as ti = −α/a2i+θi.
By doing this, we can first cancel out the gαi that the simulator does not know in
building the K component. Second, we can prevent the appearance of the term of
the form gα/ai which would have been produced in programming several terms of the
form gαaj/a
2
i of D2 components in the case of i = j.
K = (
∏
1≤j,k≤ns.t.ifj=kthenj,k 6=i
g(−αajak/a
2
i ))
∏
1≤j,k≤n
(gaiaj)θi
Kx = (
∏
(g−α·aj/a
2
i )(IDi−IDj)(g(IDi−IDj)·aj)yi)(g−α/a
2
i )zxgzxθi
L = gα/a
2
i g−θi
Challenge The adversary provides to the simulator two challenge messages M0,M1
with the challenge matrix M∗ of dimension at most q columns. The simulator will
choose random value y′2, y
′
3, ..., yn∗ and share the secret s using the vector
−→v = (s, y′2, y′3, ..., yn∗).
Then the simulator can calculate λi = v ·M∗. The simulator continues to choose
another r∗ random values µ′, µ′1, µ
′
2, ..., µr∗ such that mu
′ =
∑
imu
′
i. In computing
the ciphertext, we will use randomness µ˜ = µ+ µ′ which can be conceptually broken
into shares µ˜i = aiµ/b + µ
′. As b =
∑
j aj,
∑
i µ˜i = µ˜. Finally, the simulator creates
the challenge ciphtext CT as
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C = (T · e(g, g)αµ′)s · Mβ, C0 = gµ · gµ′
C∗i,j = (g
µai(
∏
k
gak)µ
′
)sM
∗
j,1+y
′
2M
∗
j,2,...,+M
∗
j,n∗
C ′i,j = ((
∏
1≤k≤r∗i 6=k
(gµaiaiak)IDi−IDk)gaiµzρ(i) · φµ′ii )sM
∗
j,1+y
′
2M
∗
j,2,...,+M
∗
j,n∗
Guess The adversary will eventually output a guess β′ of β. The simulator then
outputs 0 to guess that T = e(g, g)αµ if β′ = β; otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate
that it believes T is a random group element in GT . When T is a tuple the simulator
B gives a perfect simulation so we have that
Pr[B(−→X,T = e(g, g)αµ) = 0] = 1
2
+ AdvA
When T is a random group element the message Mβ is completely hidden from
the adversary and we have Pr[B(−→X,T = R) = 0] = 1
2
. Therefore, B can play the
decisional q-MEBDH game with non-negligible advantage.
5.3 Related Work
OpenID 2.0 [59] was developed as an open community-driven platform as a scalable
user-centric identity infrastructure on the Internet. Seong et al. [72] architected a
decentralized social networking infrastructure using the OpenID management system
so users can retrieve data with their established personas. A framework named mSSL
[73] is proposed to ensure user authenticity, data integrity and confidentiality in a
peer-to-peer fasion. Bertino et al. [74] designed a privacy-preserving digital identity
management system to authenticate users based on user identity properties, and
the registrar signs on the commitment of users’ attributes to generate certificate
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for the users. Lin et al. [75] proposed a privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular
communications based on group signature and identity-based signature. Chow et
al. [76] presented SPICE whereby the users can authenticate themselves to the service
providers with certificates when the registrar is offline, but the revoked users can use
certificates to access services, which is still unknown to the service providers.
Shamir first proposed the concept of Identity-Based Cryptosystems [77] whereby
the need for public-key certificates are eliminated. A practical and efficient Identity-
Based Encryption (BF-IBE) [64] scheme was presented based on bilinear pairing in
1999, followed by SK-IBE [78], and BB1-IBE [79]. Sahai and Waters proposed the first
ABE scheme [80] in 2005 where an identity is viewed as a set of descriptive attributes.
A derived version [81] was proposed to dynamically set up multicast groups with group
membership anonymity. Melissa Chase demonstrated multi-authority ABE in [82] and
it requires a central trusted party to issue the key to every user. An improved version
[51] removes the central authority, but it requires all the attribute authorities to
participate in the access control, which does not fit our scenario. The multi-authority
ABE scheme proposed in [83] also requires a centralized authority to create the master
key and accordingly generate keys to each user. In 2011, Allison Lewko and Brent
Waters presented a multi-authority attribute-based encryption system DABE [63]
in which no preset access structure exists and the key generation authorities work
independently from each other. Our DP-MAC is built on top of the integration of
IBE and DABE and they bring robustness and scalability. At the same time, the
usage of Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme allows the SSP to easily adapt the access
control policy. The MC assists in the computation and communication with different
IdPs for the MU, and it helps alleviate the threat of identity theft.
Boldyreva et al. [84] proposed an identity-based scheme with efficient user revoca-
tion capability. It applies key updates with significantly reduced computational cost
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based on a binary tree data structure and it is resistance against chosen-ciphertext
attack. Nevertheless, Libert et al. [85] notified the security problem left by Boldyreva
that its security can only be proved in the selective-ID setting where adversaries need
to reveal the victims’ identities at the beginning of the game. Consequently, they
proposed an identity-based encryption scheme with stronger adaptive-ID sense to ad-
dress the remaining issue. Li et al. [86] first introduced outsourcing computation in
identity-based encryption and presented a revocable in the server-aided settings. As
a result, it achieves constant computation cost at public key generator and private
key size at user, and the user does not have to contact public key generator for key
update. Chen et al. [87] presented an identity-based encryption scheme based on
lattices to realize efficient key revocation. Binary tree data structure is utilized to
achieve logarithmic complexity in key updates. EASiER [88] architecture is described
to support fine-grained access control policies and dynamic group membership based
on attribute-based encryption. It relies on a proxy to participate in the decryption
and enforce revocation, such that the user can be revoked without re-encrypting ci-
phertexts or issuing new keys to other users. Lewko et al. [67] two novel broadcast
encryption schemes with effective user revocation capability. The first scheme is
selectively secure in the standard model, and the second scheme achieves adaptive
security by exploiting dual encryption technique. The ciphertext size only relates to
the number of revoked users and the size of public/private keys are constant. Yu et
al. [87] proposed an attribute-based data sharing scheme where each attribute gets
three distinct values for its positive form, negative form as well as ”don’t care” form.
It addressed the issue of attribute revocation by relying on a semi-trustable online
proxy to perform re-encryption and take most laborious tasks.
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5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a distributed identity management system DP-MAC is presented
to address a few security concerns in a decentralized MCS environment. The dis-
tributed architecture of DP-MAC mitigates SPOF attack and it yields high robustness
against attacks over different participating parties. The MU’s privacy of historical
access information to different services is also ensured by separating the IdPs from
the SSP, such that the IdPs have no knowledge about the SSP that the MU tries to
log into. The SSP can dynamically adjust its access policy without incurring addi-
tional cost, and it does not store any shared secrets ot certificates of the IdPs, thereby
bringing a high scalability to the system.
An effective ID-revocable scheme is presented to provide an efficient user revoca-
tion mechanism in CP-ABE systems. Most existing research work rely on either key
regeneration or complicated tree structure based on presumed relationships between
identities and attributes, thereby resulting in overwhelming overhead in a dynamic
system where users frequently join or leave. In this ID-revocable scheme, key re-
generation for non-revoked users is not needed, and identities and attributes are
uncorrelated, thereby ensuring the greatest flexibility. Its ciphertext size, encrytion
and decryption cost are proportional to the product of the number of attributes and
the number of identities.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In the past few years, Mobile Crows Sensing (MCS) arises as an irreversible trend
to harness the immense capability of the crowd jointly with the persuasive sensor-
equipped mobile devices. The increasing computation power, storage size and pop-
ularity of sensing-capable mobile devices, when paired with omnipresent Internet
access, allow the unprecedented acquisition of knowledge about the individual owner
itself and its ambient environment. At the same time, the ascension of the cloud
computing platforms with ubiquitous connectivity, vast computational power and
unbounded storage offer perfect backend infrastructure to integrate MCS for data
transmission, processing and storage and propell the MCS paradigm from concept
into reality.
Meanwhile, MCS present distinct research challenges including sensing task assign-
ment and privacy preservation in sensing query processing, multi-party data compu-
tation and access control in data sharing. To address this issues, this dissertation
presents detailed description of solutions along with extensive simulations and exper-
iments to prove their feasibility. Greedy approaches and bee algorithms are used to
minimize the cost or maximize the utility while adhering to the Quality of Service for
sensing task assignment among regular participants. Homomorphic encryptions are
exploited to protect the privacy of user profile, sensing query content and the numeric
values of individual sensing readings. Mapreduce framework is discussed to accelerate
the data processing time. Identity-based encryption and distributed attribute-based
encryption are utilized for access control in federated identity management to avoid
single-point-of-failure of identity providers and privacy protection of SSCs’ data access
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history.
Further improvements can be made in the future. The participant selection frame-
work to cover both regular participants and opportunistic participants as our next
step. Accordingly, our future participant selection framework is anticipated to achieve
better performance and better fit into real life, as the mobility traces of most par-
ticipants in real world are inconsistent and their submissions can also contribute to
the sensing campaign. Better homomorphic encryption techniques need to be inves-
tigated for more accurate k-nearest neighbor search and they can be extended for
privacy-preserving data clustering. The complexity of distributed data access control
for federated identity management need to be reduced for better user experience.
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